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A  R e c o n s i d e r a t i o n  of the Princely and Republican Aspects of M a c h i a v e l li's 
T ho ught (120 pp.)
Director: Richard A. Chapma
Th e pu rp os e of this study was to resolve the apparent contr adiction b e ­
tween the republican and princel y teachings of M a c h i a v e l ! i. Th rou gho ut 
the many di ver se  interpretations of M a c h i a v e l ! i, there is disag reement 
o v e r  this apparent d is crepa nc y in emphasis and content between his two 
m ajo r w o r k s  on political theory. The Prince and the Discourses On The 
First De cade Of Titus Livius (henceforth D i scou rses). On the one hand.
The Pri nee is prima rily co nce rned with princes and methods of gaining and 
h old ing princely power. On the other hand, the D i scou rses is pr ima rily 
co n c e r n e d  w i t h  republican government, espe ci ally the early Roman R e p u b ­
lic, w h i c h  M a c h i a v e l li ad mired  above all other states.
All of M a c h i a v e l li's m ajor w o r k s  wer e  utilized in this study, wi th e m ­
phasis given to his m aj or  works on political theory. The Prince and the 
Di s c o u r g e s . Other primar y sources included The History of F l o r e n c e , The 
Art of W a r , and A Discou rs e On Remodeling The Gov ernment Of F l o r e n c e . Each 
w o r k  was read in search of passages dealing wit h  pertinen t topics. In a d d i ­
tion, a nu mber of se con dary sources we r e  consulted.
The co nc lusion s of this study include the following: Ther e is -no real
c o n t r a d i c t i o n  between the republican and prince ly aspects of M a c h i a v e l li's 
thought. He valued political stabil ity and en dur ance above any partic ular 
form of government. He believed that the form of government  dep ends--or 
should d ep end-- on  cir cum stanc es, spe cifically the co ndi tio n of the people 
involved. Princely power is always needed to found or to reform any g o v ­
ernment; basic changes cannot be effected  wi thout  an ab solute  author ity 
be cause  o f  the div er sity of op inions among men.- C o n f 1 ict--both between 
states and w i t h i n  sta tes-~is inevitable. Internally, confli ct primarily 
takes the form of class dis sens io n between an upper and a lower class of 
men, typical in all cities. Such conflict must be channeled in publicly 
beneficial ways. L e ad er ship on the part of an upper class is essential, 
but the e x c es sive am bition  of these men must be checked by the inclusion 
of the lower class in a mixed form of government that includes a princely, 
an aristo cratic , and a popula r element, along the lines of the ancient R o ­
man Republic. In w e l l - o r d e r e d  polities, class conflict will actually 
stre n g t h e n  a city. Republics a r e  superior to princedoms. They have a 
g r e a t e r  ca pa ci ty to g row and expand because pop ulation increases are w e l ­
comed and e c o n o m i c  a c ti vi ties are encouraged.
Militar il y, the power of the people can be ha rness ed in a citize n army by 
p r o v i d i n g  for a po pu lar share in government. A policy of mil itary e x p a n ­
sion is d e s i r a b l e  bec a u s e  w a r f a r e  is inevitable and becaus e only fear of 
de fe at  and s e r v i t u d e  at the hands of an external enemy will contain c o r r u p ­
tion for a long time. Good laws, religion, mil it ary training, and other 
m e c h a n i s m s  of social control may als o  slow the rate of corruption. Civic 
c o r r u p t i o n  is inevitable for as men reap the we a l t h  and pov/er of a s u c c e s s ­
ful society, they lose sight of the first pr inc ipl es that on c e  governed 
their behavior. Eventually, only radical reform will save a republic fr om  
total ruin and this requires the force of an a b s o l u t e  ruler.
i i
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527) has been evaluated and 
interpreted for well over four hundred years, yet there is 
still much disagreement over the nature of the man and his 
political thought.  ̂ Disagreements range from those concern­
ing the meaning of particular words used by Machiavelli to 
those concerning the whole import of his life and work. 
Throughout all of the diverse interpretations of Machia­
velli, however, there is a major area of disagreement over 
the apparent contradiction in emphasis and content between
his two major works on political theory. The Prince and the
2Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius. On the one
For historical summaries of various interpretations of 
Machiavelli, see De Lamar Jensen, ed., Machiavelli: Cynic, 
Patriot, or Political Scientist? (Boston: Heath, 1960), 
pp. I X - x iv; John Humphrey Whitfield, Machiavelli (Oxford:
B. Blackwell, 1947), pp. 1-17; and Isaiah Berlin, "The Ques­
tion of Machiavelli," A Special Supplement, The New York Re­
view of Books, XVII, No. 7 (November 4, 19 71JT pjil 20 - 22 J
2Unless otherwise specified, references to Machiavel1i ’s 
works are to Niccolo Machiavelli, Machiavelli: The Chief Works 
and Others, trans. Allan Gilbert, 3 vols. (Durham, N .C .: Duke 
University Press, 1965). His works are cited by title, book, 
and/or chapter. Pages shown refer to Gilbert’s translations. 
Since pagination is consecutive in Gilbert's translations, 
volume numbers are not shown. The Discourses on the First 
Decade of Titus Livius is simply cite^ as the Dis cours e s .
hand. The Prince, as its title implies, is primarily concerned 
with princes and methods of gaining and holding princely power. 
On the other hand, the Discours es is primarily concerned with 
republican government, especially the early Roman Republic, 
which Machiavelli admired above all other regimes in history. 
Simply put, the problem is that these two works seem diametri 
cally opposed to each other. How is it that a man could pro­
vide counsel and advice to princes, while at the same time 
expressing a definite admiration for republican government?
How can the teachings of The Prince be reconciled with the 
republican prescriptions of the Discourses ? The purpose of 
this study was to reconsider the true nature of Machiavelli's 
republicanism in an attempt to resolve this os tens ive contra­
diction in his political theory.
One of the problems in studying the life and works of 
Machiavelli is the vast and growing literature on the man, 
which includes a bewildering number of divergent interpreta- 
tions. These interpretations have changed radically from 
one historical period to the next, although even today one can 
find proponents of almost every school of thought.
A short review of the major arguments in the literature 
will give the reader some idea of the areas of disagreement 
and controversy over Machiavelli and his w o r k .  ̂ He has been
^Jensen, pp. ix-xiv; Whitfield, pp. 1-17; Berlin, pp. 20-22
^The following summary is not intended to be comprehensive. 
Rather, it is intended to provide the reader with a sense of the
vilified as a teaclier of evil, a counselor of tyrants, and 
even the devil’s disciple. Yet he has also been defended as 
a courageous opponent of tyranny, a lover of liberty, and a 
dedicated republican.
Other students of Machiavelli have focused on his metho­
dology, finding him above all to be a realist, whose ideas 
are factual and practical. Some have even concluded that 
his approach to the study of political phenomena was basically 
scientific. Hence, he has been acclaimed as the precursor 
or even the founder of modern political science, a man who 
attempted to describe political phenomena and discover general 
rules of political behavior. As such, he is viewed as a fore­
runner of a radical shift in political theory from a preoccupa­
tion with ’’what ought to be" to an analysis of "what is" in 
political affairs. But these realist and scientist views of 
Machiavelli have not gone unchallenged. Some have argued that 
Machiavelli was fundamentally unscientific, since he supposedly 
approached political phenomena with strong prejudices and pre­
conceived notions, as well as misused or ignored pertinent 
evidence to suit his own purposes. This Machiavelli was not 
objective or detached; he was emotionally involved in the p o ­
litical affairs of his time. Rather than a cold-hearted
many divergent views of Machiavelli and his writings, before 
proceeding to the central concerns of the study. For citations 
of specific interpreters, see Jensen, pp. ix-xiv; Whitfield, 
pp. 1-17; and Berlin, pp. 20-22. The following summary is 
based on these sources.
realist or detached, objective scientist, he was a passionate 
advocate, who was inconsistent in his methodology and conclu­
sions .
Since many of Machiavelli's maxims for rulers are con­
trary to conventional concepts of individual morality, he 
has also been credited with discovering the autonomous nature 
of politics, i.e., the notion that public officials must often 
act in ways normally considered immoral for a private individ­
ual. Following this argument, some have suggested that Mach­
iavelli 's advice to rulers is -- or at least was meant to be - - 
neither moral nor immoral, but rather amoral. On the other 
hand, others have disputed the very idea that politics can 
be separated from individual ethics or morality. And one 
commentator has even suggested that the most disturbing thing 
about Machiavelli is that he recognized the possibility of at 
least two moralities, or at least implied the existence of 
two moralities, by favoring the ancient, pagan religion of 
early Roman times over the Christian religion of his times.^
Machiavelli has also been portrayed as the forerunner 
of Italian nationalism. Certainly he was concerned with re­
deeming his beloved Italy from the foreign invaders that 
plagued the peninsula in his time.^ However, there is much 
disagreement over the relationship of his views to modern
^Berlin, pp. 29-30.
^See, e.g.. The Prin c e , 26, pp. 92-96.
concepts o£ "nationalism." Nor is it by any means clear that 
Machiavelli wanted a unified Italy under one prince, patterned 
after the kingdoms of France, Spain, or England. In any case, 
some have argued that his Italian patriotism led him to pre­
scribe ruling methods that were typical in his time and endemic 
to his native Italy, because he thought such methods were neces­
sary to drive the foreigners from his native land.
Another interpretation, without denying the immorality of 
his teachings, holds that Machiavelli can only be seen as a 
reflection of his times. According to this view, he wrote 
only in response to and for his own time and place. That 
being the case, he can be understood and perhaps forgiven, 
even though his precepts cannot be approved. In opposition 
to this view, many commentators believe that Machiavelli in­
tended to write for all times and places, in keeping with his 
stated views of history and the nature of mankind. Since he 
thought men are essentially the same in all ages and that his­
tory can be imitated, so the argument goes, he sought to dis­
cover general political rules of conduct that could be applied 
anywhere at any time.
This short summary indicates the plethora of differing
views of Machiavelli and his works. But what accounts for so
many divergent interpretations? For one thing, the issues
that Machiavelli wrote about are as vital and controversial
7today as they were in his time. By teaching rulers that
7jensen, p. vii.
they must often act contrary to accepted moral precepts, he 
raised the issue of what rules of conduct apply to public 
officials. He was not the first political theorist to be 
concerned with the relationship between morality and political 
actions, but he was the first to positively recommend methods 
opposed to conventional notions of morality as a means to
oestablish and maintain good political regimes. Many be­
lieve that Machiavelli taught that the political end justifies 
the means, however morally reprehensible they may be. Further­
more, Machiavelli emphasized political stability and endurance 
as goals to such an extent that some interpreters believe 
he placed the state above any moral control. He also raised 
the perennial issue of how liberty can be reconciled with the 
need for order.
Machiavelli's treatment of such issues elicited strong, 
emotional, sometimes even irrational, responses in his readers. 
Much of what he taught conflicted with conventional morality 
and professed convictions, and after his death, there developed 
an anti-Machiavelli tradition. His teachings often engendered 
fear, repulsion, and condemnation.^ As might be expected, such 
reactions did little to clarify and explain his thought. More
OSheldon S. Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continuity and 
Innovation in Western Political Thought (Boston : Little, 
Brown and Comp any i960) , p. 2 09.
^Jensen, pp. ix-xiv; see also, Whitfield, pp. 1 17, 
and Berlin, p. 22.
recently, a number of interpreters, for varying reasons, have 
defended Machiavelli and his t e a c h i n g s . H e  has been praised 
as a "realist,’* a "scientist," a "republican," a "lover of 
liberty," and so on. Unfortunately, many of Machiavelli's 
defenders have been as emotional and unreasonable in their 
views as those who have denounced him in the past. As 
Cassirer has pointed out, both approaches begin with blame 
or praise and interpret Machiavelli from these general pre­
conceptions ; it would be more productive to try to understand 
him before rendering final judgment.
The number of diverse interpretations of Machiavelli can 
also be accounted for by the apparent inability of some in­
terpreters to understand him except in terms of their own con­
cerns or the issues of their own times and places. For exam­
ple, as Italy moved toward becoming a nation-state in the 
nineteenth century, some interpreters began to view Machiavelli 
as a dedicated Italian nationalist. In the twentieth century, 
as men have become more "scientific" in the modern sense, some 
commentators began to see him in a new light; he became a 
realist, and even a detached scientist. In most cases, such 
interpretations have distorted Machiavel1i ’s meaning.
Another reason for so many interpretations of Machiavelli
^°Ibid.
^ ^ E r n s t  ____________
University Press, 1946), p. 117.
Cassirer, The Myth of the State (New Haven: Yale
8
is the way in which he conveyed his thought. It has often
been pointed out that Machiavelli must be blamed to a large
extent for the difficulties encountered in studying his 
12work. Paradoxically, one of the reasons for his continued 
popularity and influence is his powerful writing style and 
ability. Yet he frequently used the same word to convey 
different concepts and, conversely, expressed the same con­
cept with more than one word. Anglo has noted that his words 
"carry too many meanings and, always, they are key words which
clearly have great significance for Machiavelli himself 
13. . . ." But Anglo's criticism goes beyond such imprecision
and lack of clarity to include a charge of "poor thinking" and 
faulty argumentation.^^ Hexter, one of the more careful stu­
dents of Machiavelli's terminology, has correctly observed that 
while there is much agreement on which of Machiavelli's terms 
are of most interest--terms like "virtu," "fortuna," "neces- 
sita," "liberty," "stato," et cetera-- there is little agreement 
over what these terms mean. Nevertheless, Hexter is also
1 2Whitfield, pp. 92-95; Giuseppe Prezzolini, Machiavelli, 
trans. Gioconda Savini (New York: Farrar, Strauss  ̂ Giroux, 
1967), p. 4; and Sydney Anglo, Machiavelli: A Dissection (Lon­
don: Victor Fallancz, Ltd., 1969), pp. 2 39, 242-243.
^^Anglo, pp. 242-243.
^'^Ibid. , pp. 208- 209, 239.
Jack H . Hexter, The Vision of Politics on the Eve of 
the Reform ation: More, Ma~chiavel li, and Seyssel (New York : 
Basic BooTcs~[ 19 73), p . 151.
correct in saying that we must continue to try to understand 
Machiavelli's meaning, under the assumption that he knew what 
he wanted to say and that he chose his words carefully to 
communicate his thought.
Isaiah Berlin has suggested a more profound reason for 
the extent of disagreement over Machiavelli’s thought. He 
has noted that there is "evidently something peculiarly dis­
turbing about what Machiavelli said or implied, something
17that has caused profound and lasting uneasiness." That 
"something" is the idea that there may be more than one system 
of ethics or more than one morality. According to Berlin, 
Machiavelli did not separate politics from morality; he con­
sciously opted for the ancient, pagan morality over the
1 Qmodern, Christian morality. The "profound and lasting un ­
easiness" has come from the idea that there may be more than 
one system of ethics and that man must choose between them.
By raising this possibility, Machiavelli has caused anguish 
for posterity, since most men would prefer the comfort of 
one true faith. This, Berlin has suggested, accounts for the 
number of interpretations which vehemently oppose or ignore 
this central point of his thought. For this reason, Machia­
velli has been misinterpreted and misunderstood.
^^Ibid.
^^Berlin, p. 20. 
^^Berlin, pp. 29-30.
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This quick summary of the literature on Machiavelli and 
some reasons for such divergent views of his life and work 
suggest a number of pitfalls to be avoided in any study of 
Machiavelli. First, his historical reputation should be 
distinguished from his real intentions and meaning. Any 
preconceptions or prejudices, based on his historical reputa­
tion, should be discarded to allow an open-minded study.
This is especially true regarding the issue of Machiavelli's 
morality or immorality. His ethical position cannot be 
ignored but it should not be allowed to interfere with ef­
forts to understand his political theory. Second, just 
because his terminology is imprecise, we should neither 
throw up our hands in frustration nor impose our own mean­
ings on his concepts. On the contrary, we must try harder 
to understand what he meant to say, putting ourselves in 
his shoes, so to speak, and letting his words convey their 
intended meaning.
Unfortunately, if we are to fault Machiavelli for his 
imprecise use of language, we must also fault those inter­
preters who are just as imprecise in explaining his thought. 
For example, it is clear that Machiavelli made an important 
distinction between popular government or democracy and true 
republican government, and that he disapproved of popular 
government as he understood it.^^ Yet many students of
l^See, e.g.. Discourses, I, 2, pp. 195-201; The History 
of Florence, IV, 1^ pi 118 7.
11
Machiavelli have ignored that distinction, suggesting that he
2 0was an advocate of popular or democratic government. No 
doubt these commentators were well aware of the distinctions 
Machiavelli made between different kinds of government, but 
the point is that it is misleading to apply such terms so 
loosely in describing his political theory.
Moreover, some interpreters have argued that Machiavelli 
was at heart a true republican, while others have argued that 
he was either indifferent to governmental forms or even 
partial to princely government. But few studies have examined 
his views on governmental forms, especially his concept of 
republican government. And at least part of the answer to 
the apparent contradiction between The Prince and the Pis - 
cours es lies in clarifying his concept of republicanism.
In this paper, the author focused primarily on Machia­
velli ’s best known and most important theoretical works, The 
Prince and the Discourses. Since emphasis was placed on 
Machiavelli's republicanism, the author relied most of all 
on the Discourses. a work which dealt with founding and 
maintaining republics. In addition, some important theoreti­
cal points as well as corroborating material was found in 
two other major works : The History of Florence, a not-so-
20see e.g., Whitfield, p. 145; Dorothy Erskine Muir, 
M achiavelli and His Times [New i'ork: E. P. Dutton  ̂ Co., Inc. 
T9 36), ppl 154-155, 256 ; J. P. Plamenatz, Man and Society: 
Political and Social Theory. 2 vols. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1963), 1:11; Roberto Ridolfi, The Life of Niccolo Machiave lli 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 148; Leonardo 
Olschki, M achiavelli the Scientist (Berkeley, Calif.: The 
Gillick Press, 1945), pp. 3-4.
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objective work of history, and The Art of W a r , a work on the 
theory and practice of warfare. The History of Florence was 
especially useful in analyzing Machiavelli's concept of p o ­
litical corruption and decay, while The Art of War was 
valuable because of the close relationship of political and 
military affairs in Machiavelli's thought. Finally, some 
use was made of lesser known works, such as A Discourse on 
Remodeling the Government of Florence, which is a specific 
proposal on remodeling the government of Florence.
This paper is organized into three major chapters. The 
first one is entitled, "Form and Matter: The Conditions for 
Princely Rule and Republican Government," and deals with 
Machiavelli*s concept of governmental forms and the environ­
mental factors he considered crucial in founding and main­
taining princedoms and republics. The next chapter is en­
titled, "An Anatomy of a True Republic: Machiavelli’s Mixed 
State" and deals with Machiavelli's concept of republican 
government. The third chapter is entitled, "Corruption and 
Reform" and deals with Machiavelli's concept of corruption 
and reform, especially with regard to the dissolution of 
republics. Finally, there is a concluding chapter which out­
lines the major findings of the study.
CHAPTER II
FORM AND MATTER: THE CONDITIONS FOR PRINCELY 
RULE AND REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT
Machiavelli's interpreters have been especially troubled 
by the apparent inconsistency or contradiction between The 
Prince and the Discourses. In the former work, Machiavelli 
sets forth ways and means of gaining and holding princely 
power; yet in the latter work, he deals mainly with repub­
lics and expresses an admiration for republican government. 
How, then, we may ask, could a man with obvious republican 
sympathies, a man who gave much of his life and work to his 
native Florentine republic, give counsel to princes and would- 
be princes? What motivated him to do so? Was he insincere 
in either or in both of these works? Or is there some not 
so apparent reason that explains this supposed discrepancy 
in his thought? It may seem incongruous to us that a man 
who admired republics could also advise princes, in some 
instances outright tyrants of the worst sort- But there has 
never been any general consensus among students of Machia­
velli on the answers to these questions. Instead, we find 
a variety of different attempts to reconcile the princely 
and republican sides of Machiavelli.
13
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One of the more common views of this matter is that, 
despite his preference for republican government, he was 
above all a realist who recognized the need for a prince to 
reform and unite a corrupted Italy. Only then could the 
foreign invaders be driven from Italian soil. Gilbert tells 
us that Machiavelli's Prince stemmed from his "concern with 
the verita effetuale of Italian life and not any abandonment 
of his republican preferences.”  ̂ Under such conditions of 
widespread corruption, so the argument goes, old laws and 
political institutions could no longer curb and correct the 
Italian people. Hence, Machiavelli saw the need for p e r ­
sonal rule by one man to formulate and enforce new laws.
A related view holds that Machiavelli wrote The Prince 
because he perceived a unique opportunity that compelled him 
to temporarily turn away from work on his republican Dis - 
courses. That unique opportunity was the restoration of 
the Medici family to its preeminent position in Florence, 
in 1512, with the help of Spanish arms. Shortly thereafter, 
Giovanni d e 'Medici ascended to the papacy as Pope Leo X. 
These events supposedly stirred Machiavelli's mind, so that
Allan H. Gilbert, Machiavelli ' s "Prince" and Its Fore^- 
runners : "The Prince as a Typical Book * de Regimine Princi pum" 
XNew Yorkl Barnes Ç No6"!e , Inc. 7 19 38; reprinted by special 
arrangement with Duke University Press, 196 8, pp. 36, 37,
43; see also Anglo, p. 177.
2See, e.g., Whitfield, pp. 64-67, 75; Anglo, pp. 69,
78; Plamenatz, 1:13.
15
he sav; a clear parallel with the earlier opportunity afforded 
Ces are Borgia. With the aid of his father, Pope Alexander VI 
and France, Borgia had conquered the Romagna and threatened
3numerous Italian cities, including Florence. Although 
Borgia eventually lost his power after the death of his 
father, Machiavelli was presumably impressed with his ear­
lier victories and believed that the Medici could consoli­
date their power in a similar fashion, since they controlled 
both Florence and the Papacy and had the backing of powerful 
Spain.^ Thus, for Whitfield, The Prince was nothing less 
than a '’call to a native prince to master at least some part 
of Italy to save it . . . ."  ̂ Under such compelling circum­
stances, republics had to be set aside or the opportunity 
might be lost.
The idea that Machiavelli's uncompromising "realism” 
led him to accept and promote princely government has been 
carried to the incredible extreme of suggesting that he fore­
saw the coming of a new age of princes.  ̂ This proposition
2On Borgia, see Ferdi nand Schevill, Medieval and Renais - 
sance Florence, vol. I: The Coming of Humanism and the Age of 
the Medici (Harper Torchbook Edition ; New York: Harper  ̂ R o w, 
1963), pp. 457-462.
^Whitfield, p. 63; Anglo, pp. 64-65.
 ̂Wh itfield, p. 67.
^Roberto Ridolfi, The Life of N iccolo Machiavelli, trans, 
Cecil Grayson (Chicago: University of" Chicago Press, r965) , 
p. 14 8; Olschki, pp. 1-2.
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can be dismissed for lack of any convincing evidence to sup­
port it, and because Machiavelli's written word strongly sug­
gests that he had not given up on republics in his time or 
for the future.
Others, like Olschki, Felix Gilbert, Cassirer, and Anglo, 
see Machiavelli*s concern for republican government as purely
7a matter of speculation on his part. In other words, as 
realistic and practical as Machiavelli may have been, they 
contend that he could not have expected a revitalization of 
republican government, especially in Italy, which he considered 
so corrupt. Anglo even reaches the unlikely conclusion that 
both The Prince and the Discourses were written without much, 
if any, confidence on the part of their author in the prac­
tical possibilities of his proposals for either princely or
Orepublican rule. Both works, according to Anglo, were 
purely speculative, academic exercises, even in Machiavell i 's 
eyes .
But the view that Machiavelli's writings on republican 
or princely government were purely speculative, academic 
exercises in his own mind is unsubstantiated. Around the 
time he was writing The Prince one of the current topics of
Olschki, pp. 3-4; Anglo, p. 177; Cassirer, pp. 145-147; 
PeliX Gilbert. Machiavelli and Guicciardini: Politics and 
History in Sixteenth-Century Florence (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princc~tcTjrT'TJnTversity Press, "T965), p . 155 .
^AngTo, pp. 78, 177, 180-183, 208-209.
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interest to Florentines was whether and how Pope Leo X 
(Giovanni d e ’Medici) might make his brother and his nephew 
princes.  ̂ Moreover, as Gilbert has pointed out, Machiavelli 
said his Prince should be welcomed by a new prince, and he 
dedicated his work to the Pope’s nephew, Lorenzo d e 'Medici.
At the same time, to many of Machiavelli's fellow Floren­
tines, it seemed likely that the same Medici Pope might 
prefer to set up a new republican form of government in 
Florence, and the form that such a republic should or might 
take was much discussed at the time the Discourses was being 
w r i t t e n . M a c h i a v e l l i  was also intensely interested in 
these same issues. He participated, along with Florentine 
aristocrats and transient guests from other parts of Italy, 
in the discussions on political affairs held in the Rucellai
gardens, originally built by Bernardo Rucellai late in the
1 ̂fifteenth century. “ Finally, in response to a request from 
Pope Leo X, Giovanni de’Medici, he wrote a lessor known work
on how the Medici might reorganize Florence into a better re-
13public. That work is basically consistent with his other
writings, and there is no apparent reason to believe that he was
^Felix Gilbert, p. 155.
^^Ibid.
^^Ibid.
Ibid., p. 80; Anglo, p. 87; Ridolfi, p. 168.
1 ̂ A Discourse on Remodeling the Government of Florence, 
pp. 101-115.
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insincere when he wrote his proposal or that he saw it as 
only another academic exercise. It is more reasonable to 
assume that he believed in the practical possibilities of 
his proposal, and that he believed his suggestions could be 
used to institute a Florentine republic similar to his 
favorite state, the ancient Roman Republic. The point is 
that The Prince and the Discourses deal with topics that 
were of immediate interest to Machiavelli and his contem­
porary Florentines, and there is no reason to assume that 
he spent so much of his time on writings which he did not 
believe were meaningful or practical. If anything about 
Machiavelli can be agreed upon, it would seem to be that 
he was seeking practical, workable, and flexible political 
rules. It is one thing to say that his theories are un­
realistic or impractical, or were so in his day, but it is 
quite another thing to argue that he considered his own work 
as speculative and academic.
Nor should Machiavelli be related to a strictly contem­
porary context. He wrote for all times, as well as to provide 
solutions for the ills of Italy and Florence. The answer to 
the apparent contradiction between The Prince and the Pis - 
courses can be found in Machiavelli’s own words--in those 
works and in his other writings. There are difficulties of 
interpretation, as noted in chapter 1, due to the way in 
which Machiavelli presented his ideas. Nevertheless, unless
19
we are willing to assume that he was insincere or totally un­
systematic in what he wrote, we should first make an attempt 
to understand his theory by listening to what he said. Such 
an approach may lead to theoretical connections that resolve 
the supposed discrepancies between The Prince and the Dis - 
courses.
The suggestion that Machiavelli turned to princely rule 
as the only way to save a corrupted Italy presumes that he 
believed all of Italy was corrupted in such a way or to such 
an extent that a well-organized republic could not be founded 
anywhere. Such is not the case. He believed that certain 
cities and regions of Italy were peculiarly suited for re­
publican g o v e r n m e n t . H e  placed his native city of Florence 
and its surrounding region, Tuscany, in this c a t e g o r y . N o t  
only were the people of such cities and regions considered 
capable of sustaining a republican regime, but he said it 
would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to impose 
anything but republican government on such p e o p l e s . O n  the
other hand, he believed that some parts of Italy were ill
17suited for anything but princely rule. Hence, the image
^^Discourses, I, 55, p. 309.
■^*^Ibid. ; A Discourse on Remodeling the Government of 
Florence , p p . 106-10 7.
^^Discourses, I, 55, p. 310; A Discourse on Remodeling 
the Gcvehûrment of Florence, p p . 106-10 7,
^^ibid.
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of a corrupt Italy without hope, save for a prince who would 
seize power and unite her, is simply not an accurate descrip­
tion of Machiavelli's views of Italy and the Italian peoples 
of his' time .
This notion that certain peoples are best suited for 
one form of government or anotherj or that the form of gov­
ernment should be adapted to fit the matter (i.e., the people 
involved), means that for Machiavelli the proper type of 
regime depends--or should depend--on circumstances or condi 
tions. He was clearly not commiitted to any one form of 
government under any and all conditions. As Whitfield puts
it, lie was not "absolutely preoccupied with the question" of
18whether a republic is better than a monarchy. In other
words, he was not absolutely attached, emotionally or other­
wise, to any one form of government.
That Machiavelli believed in adapting the form of govern­
ment to fit prevailing conditions suggests that he placed a 
higher value on political stability and endurance than on any 
particular form of government. It will become evident in 
later pages that he was above all concerned urith ways and 
means of coping with change to ensure the continued survival 
of political regimes in a hostile world. For him, circum­
stances or conditions determine which form of government is 
advisable.
^^Whitfield, pp. 119-120.
But we should not take this to mean that he had no pre­
ferences. There is ample proof that he preferred republican 
government and that he considered it superior to princely 
rule. .Prezzolini went too far in saying that Machiavelli 
’’believes implicitly that no single political system can 
claim superiority over another. We will explore this 
matter in subsequent chapters. Suffice it for now to say that 
one of the reasons he preferred republican government was be­
cause he believed that such regimes normally survive longer 
than princely governments.
The idea that Machiavelli, unlike many of his predeces­
sors, was not coiiimitted to one form of government in an ab­
solute sense, and that political stability and endurance were 
his main concerns, goes a long way towards resolving the ap­
parent discrepancy between his princely and republican writ­
ings. Knowing that he viewed things in this way, one can 
then proceed to explore other connections between The Prince 
and the Pis courses.
Some commentators suggest that these works can be recon­
ciled by virtue of the similarity of teachings in each book. 
Usuaily this argument takes the form of saying that everything 
one finds in The Prince, even the most "detestable” maxims, can 
also be found somewhere in the Discourses. For Plamenatz, the 
’’arguments of The Prince are perfectly consistent with the
^^Prezzolini, p. 37.
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arguments of the much longer Discourses . . . there is scarcely
a maxim in The Prince whose equivalent is not to be found in
2 0the Discourses." However, Whitfield preferred to turn the
point around and say that what is "healthy" in the Discourses
can also be found in The Prince, which is an odd sort of way
21to defend Machiavelli. To Butterfield, the siùiilarity of
methods advocated in the two works supports the idea that 
Machiavelli attempted to devise a "science of general state­
craft," which would be "permanently applicable and univer-
2 2sally valid." Similarly, Olschki considers Machiavelli's
doctrines "equally effective in any kind of regime, repub-
2 3lican or autocratic." How "scientific" Machiavelli was or 
intended to be does not concern us here. But the idea that 
we can reconcile The Prince and the Discourses by the simi­
larity of advice given in each work is questionable. It is 
true that both works contain some similar advice. And there 
is continuity and coherence between them, in the sense that 
he focuses largely on the techniques or processes of govern­
ing, or the art of ruling, in both books. Nevertheless, in 
many respects, he advocated techniques of ruling for republics
^^Plamenatz, 1:13.
 ̂̂ Whitfield, p. 75.
^^Herbert Butterfield, The Statecraft of Machiavelli 
(London: G. Belland Sons, LtdTT T941T'̂  p p . 102-rôT7~
^^Olschki, p. 51; see also, pp. 36-37.
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quite different from methods to be used in setting up and 
maintaining princely government. It is not true that all of 
Machiavelli•s doctrines or maxims were intended to be used 
in any kind of regime.
Another attempt to reconcile The Prince and the Dis­
courses involves the argument that the former work represents 
nothing more than an effort by Machiavelli to gain the favor 
of the Medici, so that he might again be active in political 
a f f a i r s . T h u s  Machiavelli’s sincerity is called into ques­
tion. But even if he did write The Prince primarily to im­
press the Medici, Prezzolini is correct in suggesting that it 
was a sincere work.^^ If he was trying to impress the Medici, 
he would have certainly wanted to give meaningful and prac­
tical counsel, something that would have suggested to the 
Medici that he would be a valuable man to have around. Be 
that as it may, Machiavelli probably wrote The Prince for 
several reasons, including his desire to gain a job under 
the new government in Florence. Whatever personal reward
^"^Machiavelli was removed from his governmental post, 
as Secretary of the Second Chancery, in 1512, after the Medici 
were restored to their former prominence in Florence. He had 
been selected to this post on June 19, 1498, at the age of 29. 
Having served a government formed after the Medici had been 
driven from Florence, Machiavelli did not have the confidence 
or trust of the Medici upon their return. See Ridolfi, pp. 19 
20.
2^Prezzolini, pp. 115-116.
26see, e.g., Ridolfi, pp. 152-153 ; Prezzolini, p. 115; 
Anglo, pp. 63-64; Ralph Roeder, The Man of the Renaissance:
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Machiavelli may have expected for his effort. The Prince
represents much more than simply a means to gain a job.
A few interpreters see The Prince as a satire. For
Mattingly, it is a denunciation, exposition, and derisory
2 7comment on tyranny. According to this view, the true
Machiavelli is to be found in the D iscours es. To support
his argument, Mattingly has pointed out that those who have
said The Prince was written because a prince was thought
necessary to create a "strong state capable of expansion,"
ignore the fact that Machiavelli preferred republics in
large measure because they, rather than princedoms, "widened
2 8their boundaries." Actually, Machiavelli believed that a
republic, specifically the Florentine republic, could best
liberate Italy from the barbarian invaders that plagued the 
29peninsula. Mattingly is correct in saying that Machiavelli 
did not believe that Italy could be saved only by a prince.
As noted above, he believed certain parts of Italy were still 
best suited for republican government. And he did consider 
republics superior in their capacities for growth and expan-
Four Lawgivers: Savonarola, Machiavelli, Castiglione, Aretino 
(New YorEl The Viking Press , 19 3 3) , pp . 2:86- 28 7 .
2 7Garrett Mattingly, "Machiavell i 's Prince: Political 
Science or Political Satire?," The American Scholar, XXVII 
(Autumn, 1958): 482-491.
22]: bicl.
29Ibid.
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sion, vrhich is dealt with in the next chapter. Neverthe­
less, The Prince was not written as a satire. There are too 
many significant connections between The Prince and Machia­
velli ’s other works to sustain that point of view. In his 
writings, Machiavelli demonstrated a willingness to give 
advice to all rulers or would-be rulers. Moreover, he 
valued political stability and endurance above all, and he 
thought the appropriate form of government depends on cir­
cumstances, specifically the condition of the people involved 
There is also ample evidence to show that he really desired 
to be active in political affairs again, and The Prince, if 
it impressed the Medici, was a means to that end. Above all, 
he was especially concerned about finding ways to expel for­
eign invaders from Italian soil; The Prince was dedicated to 
that end. Finally, Mattingly's contention is based on a mis­
reading of Machiavelli's theory of princely power.
A more credible attempt to explain the difference between 
The Prince and the Discourses is the suggestion that they 
represent a distinction between the need for personal power 
on the one hand and the prerequisites for maximum political 
stability and survival on the other hand. In Wolin's terms, 
Machiavelli saw the need for a hero prince, who would found 
a republican state out of a badly corrupted people, and so 
he explored the actions necessary to acquire and effectively
26
30exercise personal power in The Prince. But in the Pis- 
courses, Wolin believes that he developed a "greater apprecia­
tion" for the "political capabilities of the masses and cor­
respondingly greater doubts about the utility of political 
31heroes." Wolin's thesis is essentially correct, but Mach­
iavelli advocated princely power for various purposes, under 
both incorrupt and degenerate conditions. Moreover, Wolin 
suggests that the Discourses represent a stage in the develop­
ment of Machiavelli’s thinking, in which he supposedly came 
to appreciate the capabilities of the people even more and 
the utility of princely heroes even less. This suggested 
development in Machiavel1i 's thinking, however, is neither 
apparent nor substantiated by the evidence. The Discourses 
does show the importance Machiavelli attached to the people 
and republican government, but it also reiterates the impor­
tance of and need for princely power, as expounded in The 
Prince.
This brings us to a central concept in Machiavelli’s
theory: the importance of the founding act. He believed
that the founding of a new civic order or the radical reform-
32ing of an old one should be the work of one man alone.
^^Wolin, pp. 229-232.
^^Ibid., p. 229.
^^Discourses, I, 9, p. 218; 17, pp. 239-240; 18, p. 243; 
58, p. 317; The History of Florence, III, 6, p. 1148 ; IV, 1, 
p. 1187.
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3 3However, in practice he knew that this rarely happened.
Even the Roman Republic, which he so admired, was not blessed 
with one hero-founder, but became well-organized through 
chance events, brought about, in large measure, by class con­
flict between the nobles and p l e b e i a n s . N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  he 
believed that the founding act could be the work of one man.
It had happened in the case of Sparta, where the laws of
35Lycurgus were observed for over eight hundred years. Be­
sides, the results of class conflict are uncertain. For 
Rome, the result was unique: a mixed state of unparalleled
strength and dominion. For Florence, the result was a de­
fective constitution.^^ Ideally, then, a government should 
be organized or reorganized by one man, possessing absolute 
power.
To Machiavelli, this same principle applied to Florence,
his native city. He said that leaders and would-be founders
of new governments in Florence had failed precisely because
3 7they did not seize absolute authority. Had they done so, 
he suggests that they might have compelled men to accept a 
new order, when persuasion failed.
^^Discourses, 1 , 2, p . 19 6.
^"^Ibid., I, 2, pp. 196-200.
^^Ibid., p. 196.
^^The History of Florence, III, 1, pp. 1140-1141.
^^The Prince, 6, pp. 26-27; Discourses, III, 3, pp. 424- 
425; 30, p. 497.
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But Machiavelli’s emphasis on the need for princely rule 
to institute a new civic order should not be confused with 
his concept of a well-organized princedom. The act of found­
ing a new government by an absolute ruler is not the same as 
a princedom itself, which is one form of government a founder
might establish. Machiavelli divided al] governments into
3 8two broad categories: princedoms and republics. For Mach­
iavelli, the work of the true founder is to organize one or 
the other of these two forms of government in such a way that 
the new regime survives his death and eliminates, at least for 
a long time, the need for an absolute ruler. In Wolin's 
words, "the true prince would be one who, in the act of
39realizing his virtu , would render himself superfluous." 
Machiavelli realized that most princes are more concerned 
with consolidating and maintaining their own power during 
their lifetimes, rather than founding a long-lasting regime. 
He also knew that some princes, whatever their intentions, do 
not understand what needs to be done to establish stable, dur 
able constitutions. The true founder would possess the know-
^^The Prince, 1, p. 11; see also ibid., 12, p. 48; Dis­
courses^ Pre face, pp. 190, 191; 1, p. 193; 2, p. 1951 5̂, 
pp. 218, 219; 10, p. 220; 11, p. 226; 12, p. 228; 16, pp.
236, 238; 25, p. 253; 26, p. 253; 58, p. 318; II, 24, p.
393; III, 1, p. 419; The History of Florence , II, 1, p. 1080; 
VII, 33, p. 1378; The Art of War, T1 p p . 5~73, 575 , 577 ; II,
pp. 607, 608, 610, 619, 622 ; IV,' p. 661; VII, p. 726.
^^Wolin, p. 231.
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ledge that he can attain one of the highest and most enduring 
forms of glory by succeeding in establishing a government, 
whether princedom or republic, which does not depend solely 
on his own abilities or those of any one man after his death, 
but which depends, rather, on many citizens or sub;j ects . 
Whether a prince is striving to set up a kingdom or a repub­
lic, the general objective should be the same: to organize 
a new order of laws and institutions that will produce its 
"own m o m e n t u m , r a t h e r  than depending on the ruling skills 
of any one man. In a princedom, so organized, even the king 
would not exercise absolute power in all matters. In
Machiave1li ’s opinion, the best example of such a kingdom in 
his time was France, because that state supposedly had in­
stitutional arrangements and customs which satisfied all 
classes of men while both preserving and limiting the king's 
power.
Machiavelli*s stress on the need for princely power of 
an absolute sort to found new civic orders or to radically 
reform existing ones must also be distinguished from tyranny. 
Surely much of Machiavelli's advice could be used by a tyrant 
to gain and hold his own power, without any consideration for
^ (^Discourses, I, 9, pp. 218-219; 10, p. 220; 11, pp. 225-
226.
'^^Wolin, p. 231.
^^See, e.g.. The Prince, 4, p. 20; 19, p. 70; Discourses, 
I, 58, p. 314; II, Preface, p. 322; III, 1, p. 422; The Art 
of W a r , I , p . 55 7.
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building a stable and just regime. To our discomfort, Mach­
iavelli even tells the potential tyrant how cruel and bloody 
he must be to attain power over people who are uncorrupted 
and used to managing their own affairs as c i t i z e n s . Y e t  
we must also credit Machiavelli with being consistent in 
warning such tyrants that their regimes are fraught with 
dangers and are not likely to last even during their life­
time, let alone following their deaths, And he never ad­
vocated tyranny in the sense of unrestrained and arbitrary 
use of power by one individual to satisfy irrational desires 
or ambitions.
Machiavelli was acutely aware of the strength of tradi­
tion. He knew that men cling tenaciously to the past, the 
familiar, and their habits and c u s t o m s . T h i s  is one reason 
why he said a government is sustained best when it is left to 
the care of many, rather than to one man: for no general 
agreement can be reached to change or abandon the traditional 
o r d e r . I f  one's objective is to found a new order, one 
must overcome these differences of opinion and this resistance
^^See, e.g.. The Prince, 5, pp. 23-24; 8, pp. 35-39; 9, 
pp. 39-42; Discourses, I, 26, pp. 253-254.
^^Discourses, I, 2, pp. 197-198, 199; 10, pp. 221-22 3; 
40, p. 283; III, 5, pp. 427-428; 6, p. 430; The Prince, 5, 
pp. 23-24; 8, p. 38; 19, pp. 67-76.
^ See ; e.g.. The Prince, 6, p. 26.
'^^Discourses, I, 2, p. 196; 9, p. 218.
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to c h a n g e . T o  do that, there is a need to concentrate
power in one man, who can then effect basic reforms. This
is possible, despite the forces of tradition, if a new prince
follows Machiavelli’s precepts and succeeds in establishing
4 8a stable, well-organized regime.
Machiavelli 's emphasis on political stability and lon­
gevity and on the importance of the founding act and tradi­
tion can be understood better by considering his views of 
history. Early in the Pis courses, he restated the Polybian 
theory of cyclical change in forms of government, as though 
it provided a descriptive and explanatory basis for under­
standing historical transformations of governments.^^ Yet 
we know he did not subscribe to the idea of an endless recur­
rence of governmental forms. For one thing, he said that few, 
if any, states could survive the entire cycle; as states 
struggle with other states, they are always in danger of being
"^^Ibid.
^^The Prince, 24, p- 88.
"^^Briefly, 'that theory holds that princedoms naturally 
arise as the first form of government, but then degenerate 
into tyrannies; tyrannies are eventually overturned and re­
placed by governments of the best men, i.e., aristocracies 
which then degenerate into governments of the few, i.e., 
oligarchies; governments of the few are eventually over­
thrown and replaced by popular governments or governments 
dominated by the people, but these degenerate into licen­
tiousness and abuse of Ixberty; and finally, corrupted pop 
ular governments are reformed and replaced by new prince­
doms, which in turn, degenerate again into tyrannies, and 
so begins the cycle once more. See Discourses, I, 2, pp. 
197-199.
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subjected to external intervention and domination by a bet­
ter organized r e g i m e . M o r e  important, he offers an alterna­
tive to the would-be founder of a new state; a prudent orga­
nizer can establish a mixed form of government that partakes 
of all three good forms of government, i.e., princedom, 
aristocracy, and p o p u l a r . T h u s ,  whatever the merit of 
the Polybian theory, he did not accept its deterministic 
implications. It did, however, provide him with a useful 
starting point for his argument that a mixed form of repub­
lic is inherently more stable and durable than any of the 
simple forms of government.
Moreover, in a broader sense, the Polybian view was not 
incompatible with his concept of history, which was cyclical 
rather than linear or progressive. He believed that the 
political ills of his day, especially those of Italy and his
native Florence, stemmed above all from a misunderstanding of
5 2man and his history. He indicted his contemporaries for 
not looking to the past for guidance in coping with the pres­
ent and the future; for they enjoyed reading about ancient
events and people, in some cases admiring past deeds, but
5 3never thought of imitating them. His contemporaries failed
SOibid., p. 199. 
51 Ibid.
C JDiscourses, I, Preface, p. 191. 
^^Ibid., pp. 190-192.
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to imitate past events and people because many of them judged 
that "imitation is not merely difficult but impossible, as if 
the sky, the sun, the elements, men, were changed in motion, 
arrangement, and power from what they were in antiquity.
But this is not so, according to Machiavelli, and he wanted 
to correct this error in knowledge. For he believed that 
men are basically the same in all ages, possessing the same 
" p a s s i o n s ^ ^  Hence, imitation of ancient examples is en­
tirely possible.
All of Machiavelli's writings are imbued with this 
faith in the possibilities of imitating the best examples 
of the past.^^ And contrary to Anglo’s suggestion that 
Machiavelli had apparently lost all hope of saving Italy by 
the time he wrote his History of Florence, we find the same 
belief in the efficacy of imitating past examples in all of
his major works, including his last one. The History of 
57Florence.
^^Ibid., p. 191.
S 51 bicl. , III , 43, p. 521.
^^See, e.g.. The Prince, Dedicatory Letter, pp. 10-11; 
6, pp. 24-25; 7, pp. 33-34; 14, pp. 56-57; 19, p. 76; 26, 
pp. 93-94; Discourses, I, Preface, pp. 190-192; II, Preface, 
pp. 321-324; 4, p. 339; 30, pp. 411-412; III, 10, p. 454;
27, p. 490; 43, p. 521; The Art of War, Preface, pp. 566-
567; I, pp. 571-57 2 ; 6, pi 699 ; T, pp. 7 21 726; The History
of Florence, V, 1, pp. 1232-1233.
^^Anglo, pp. 177, 180-183.
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To clarify his own position on comparing contemporary 
and ancient times, Machiavelli began Book Two of the Pis - 
courses by stating that men often erroneously praise the 
past and blame the present, which would seem to raise doubts 
about his own admiration of ancient t h i n g s . B u t  his purpose 
is to show that human affairs are in constant motion, alter­
nating between ascent and degeneration.^^ He suggests that 
the amount of bad and good in the world remains relatively 
constant, but that concentrations of good and bad change over 
time from one location to a n o t h e r . H o w e v e r ,  the last great 
concentration of good (or excellence^ had disappeared with 
the fall of the Roman Empire; since that time, it had been
 ̂ A1scattered among many different areas. Perhaps the most 
comprehensive statement of Machiavelli's views on the con­
stant flux in human affairs can be found in The History of 
Florence :
In their normal variations, countries gen­
erally go from order to disorder and then 
from disorder move back to order, because 
--since Nature does not allow worldly 
things to remain fixed--when they come to 
their utmost perfection and have no fur­
ther possibility for rising, they must go 
down. Likewise, when they have gone down 
and through their defects have reached the
^^Discourses, II, Preface, pp. 321-324. 
591bid., p. 322 ; I, 6, pp. 210-211. 
^^Ibid., II, Preface, p. 322.
^^Ibid.
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lowest depths, they necessarily rise, since
they cannot go lower. So always from good
they go down to bad, and from bad rise up 
to good. Because ability brings forth 
quiet; quiet, laziness; laziness, disorder; 
disorder, ruin ; and likewise from ruin comes 
order; from order, ability; from the last glory and good f o r t u n e . 62
He believed that the rise and fall of Rome had fit this pat­
tern. Once Rome had conquered much of the world, degeneration
set in, resulting eventually in the dissolution of Roman po'wer. 
When he looked at his own times, he concluded that Italy, as 
a whole, had fallen to the lowest depths of ruin. Thus, the
question of whether it is appropriate to blame the present
and praise the past depends on the times. And after caution­
ing men on being too ready to blame the present, he justifies 
his own criticism of contemporary Italy by the conclusive 
nature of the evidence:
I do not know, then, whether I deserve to be 
numbered with those who deceive themselves 
if in these Discourses of mine I overpraise 
ancient Roman times and find fault with our
own. And truly, if the excellence that then
prevailed and the corruption that now pre­
vails were not clearer than the sun, I would 
keep my speech more cautious, fearing to 
bring upon myself the very deception of which 
I accuse others.63
Machiavelli’s concept of history, then, assumes constant 
change in human affairs. At any given point in time, a country
^^The History of Florence, V, 1, p. 1232. 
^^Discourses, II, Preface, p. 324.
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will either be ascending to new heights of power and glory 
or descending to new depths of weakness and degeneracy.
This inay be mistaken for a deterministic view of history 
that conflicts with Machiavelli's emphasis on the role of 
the rational, hero-prince, who is needed to found a new civic 
order or to radically reform an existing one. But Machiavelli 
did not ascribe to a deterministic view of history. His be­
lief in the feasibility of imitating the past suggests that 
men can make rational choices about what kind of historical 
leaders and polities they wish to emulate in their own times. 
V/ith proper knowledge to guide them, men can impact the rush 
of events. Of course, all events cannot be foreseen, and to 
be effective, men must often make choices within limits set 
by prevailing conditions or circumstances. For example, a 
badly corrupted city cannot easily be reformed all at once, 
if at all, into a viable republic; the wiser choice, in such 
cases, is to establish a well-ordered princedom. Machiavelli’s 
view of history was cyclical, in the sense that he thought men 
remain basically the same in all ages and that history can, 
therefore, repeat itself. But his view of history was not 
deterministic for he believed that men can intervene, in a 
rational sense, to influence events and to improve the civic 
order.
Although he did not view the rise and fall of countries 
in a deterministic sense, he did believe that countries sub-
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jected to disorder and ruin over a long period of time are 
likely to produce men who seek to establish a new civic order, 
especially if corruption has caused extreme s u f f e r i n g . A n d  
he placed Italy as a whole in this condition, even though the 
degree of corruption varied significantly between different 
Italian cities and regions. In The Prince, he suggested that 
Italy was clearly ready for a redeemer to bring order where 
there was chaos and to end the suffering and humiliation 
caused by foreign barbarians. The common danger of foreign 
invasion and domination and the insecurity of living under 
poorly organized government provided an ideal opportunity to 
reform the civic order, for suffering and the fear of even 
greater suffering make men willing to follow a new leader and 
to support a new regime.
But if Machiavelli despaired of saving Italy, as some 
have suggested, it is not evident in his writings. He thought 
that Italy had reached the nadir of her decline, and in keep­
ing with his stated view of human, affairs , he was sure that 
she could rise up again to new glory. Because of her total 
ruination and suffering at the hands of incompetent leaders 
and foreign barbarians, her people would once again come to 
know what is needed for regeneration to occur, unless an
'̂̂ The History of Florence, V, 1, p. 1232 
^^The Prince, 26, pp. 92-93.
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"unusual force" prevented it.^^
And corrupt leadership was the root of the Italian di­
lemma. In chapter 25 of The Prince, Machiavelli suggests that 
fortune "shows her power where strength and wisdom do not 
prepare to resist her, and directs her fury where she knows 
that no dykes or embankments are ready to hold her."^^ He 
then compared Italy to a "plain without dykes and without any 
embankment . . . . The meaning of this metaphor is clear:
Italy was capable of regeneration through effective leadership 
and sound organization. Now, however, she lacked "good armies"
and "good laws," the primary foundations of any government, and
69nowhere did she attend to appropriate religious practices.
The political, military, and religious institutions of Italy 
had become corrupted, and as a result, that region suffered 
under misgovernment, constant warfare (of an inconclusive
70sort), military defeats, foreign domination, and disunion.
But Machiavelli had not given up hope that Italy, or some part
^^The History of Florence, V, 1, pp. 1232-1233.
^^The Prince, 2 5, p . 90.
^^Ibid.
^^Ibid., 12, p. 47; Discourses, II, Preface, p. 323; The 
Art of W a r , Dedication, pi 56 7; II, p. 608.
^^See, e.g.. The Prince, 12, pp. 50-51; 24, pp. 88-89; 
Discourses, I, 12, p. 2 28; 55, pp. 307-308; II, Preface, 
pp. 322-323; III, 36, p. 511; The Art of War, Dedication, 
p. 567, II, pp. 602, 608, 623, 624; V, p. 67l; VII, p. 722, 
724-725; The History of Florence, I, 39, p. 1079; III, 5, 
pp. 1145-1148; VlJ, 28, p. 137%7
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of it, would regain something approaching the stability and
71strength of ancient Rome. The reason previous leaders had
failed to redeem Italy was because "her old institutions were
not good, and not one has been wise enough to devise new 
72ones. . . Not all of the peoples of Italy were greatly
corrupted; if they had been, reform would have been extremely
7 3difficult, perhaps impossible. Where the matter (i.e., a 
people) is totally corrupted, even a prudent founder would 
have much difficulty establishing good customs and laws that 
would last beyond his own lifetime.
In Italy, according to Machiavelli, much of the matter
was far from total corruption. The great founders of the past
had "nothing more than the opportunity, which gave them matter
into v^hich they could introduce whatever form they chose," and
Italy presented a new founder with just such opportunities:
Having taken account, then, of everything dis­
cussed above, and meditating whether at present 
in Italy conditions so unite as to offer a new 
prince glory, and whether the matter to be 
found here assures to a prudent and able ruler 
a chance to introduce a form that v/ill bring 
him glory and her people general happiness, I 
believe so many things now join together for 
the advantage of a new prince that I do not 
know what time could ever be more fit for such 
a prince to act . . . .  And in Italy tliere is
^^See The Prince, 26, pp. 92-96; The Art of War, VII,
p . 7 26. 
72 The Prince, 25, p. 94; cf. The Art of War, VII, p. 724.
^^Discourses, I, 17, pp. 239-240.
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no lack of mattei' on which to impose any 
form; there is great power in the limbs, if 
only it were not wanting in the heads.74
As previously noted, Machiavelli believed in the idea 
that certain peoples are best suited for one form of govern­
ment or another, i.e., either a princedom or a republic.
Thus, he counsels would-be founders to carefully consider 
the matter (i.e., the people) involved and to organize the 
most appropriate form of government, given the condition of 
the matter. In other words, the founder should adopt the 
form most suited to the matter. To attempt to do otherwise 
is a risky business at best and not likely to succeed, except 
perhaps during the life of an exceptional ruler.
But why is it that, in some cases, a princedom is the 
most appropriate form of government to impose on a people, 
while in other cases, a republican regime is more suitable?
What conditions or circumstances favor one form of government 
over the other? We find the answers to these questions in 
Machiavelli’s concepts of "equality" and "inequality," "liberty" 
and "servitude," and "corruption." We must explore the meanings 
of these terms in more depth to understand Machiavelli's theory 
of form and matter, or the conditions for princely rule and 
republican government.
Since he provided a rather precise definition of what he 
meant by "inequality," perhaps it is best to start there. In
^'^The Prince, 6, p. 25; 26, pp. 92-95
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commenting on the goodness still to be found in the German 
republics of his own time, Machiavelli states that the quality 
of political life in Germany could be accounted for by the 
fact that "they have not had many dealings with their neigh­
bors," and thus have not taken up corrupt practices of other 
lands, and have not allowed any citizen to become a "gentle­
man or to live in the fashion of one," preserving "among them-
75selves a complete equality." Then to avoid any misunderstand
ing, he defined what he meant by "gentleman":
To explain what this name of gentleman means,
I say that they are called gentleman who with­
out working live in luxury on the returns from 
their landed possessions, without paying any 
attention either to agriculture or to any 
other occupation necessary for making a living.
Such men as these are dangerous in every repub­
lic and in every country, but still more dan­
gerous are they who, besides the aforesaid 
fortunes, command castles and have subjects 
who obey t h e m . 76
Simply put, where such men exist, there is inequality; where 
they are absent, there is equality. To help clarify the mat­
ter, we might consider what Machiavelli said about the gentle­
men of Venice in his time. These were not gentlemen of the 
kind mentioned above, because their incomes were not based on 
landed possessions but rather on "trade and movable property" 
and because they did not possess castles or jurisdiction over
7 SDiscourses, I, 55, p. 308, 
^^Ibid.
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7 7subjects. They were called gentlemen because of their rank 
or standing in that republic, since they were men of the 
upper class. This, and additional evidence to be considered
in later chapters, indicates that Machiavelli was not opposed
to differences of rank in government based on socio-economic 
clas s .
For Machiavelli, great inequality of the sort defined
above is synonymous with extensive political corruption and
7 8a limited capacity for republican government. Machiavelli’s
concepts of republican government and corruption will be ana­
lyzed in more depth in later chapters, but for now, Machia­
velli ’s concept of political corruption may be defined as the 
slow erosion of customs, habits, and institutions supportive 
of an active, "free" life, or republican government. Such 
erosion begins at the leadership level and gradually spreads
from one generation to the next to the entire matter or 
79people. Although Machiavelli believed certain peoples of 
Italy were only partially, if at all, corrupted, he saw con­
siderable corruption in the heads or rulers of Italy, as well 
as in the institutional arrangements of Italian polities.
Since he believed in constant change, this corruption would 
either spread or leadership and organization would have to
^^Ibid., p . 310.
^^Ibid., 17, pp.
^^Ibid., 17, pp.
4%
be radically reformed. Certain parts of Italy--such as 
Naples, Rome, Romagna, Lombardy, and Milan--had already
o nfallen to the depths of extreme inequality and corruption.
In such regions, the corruption and ineptitude for republican
government stemmed from the great inequality experienced over
81a relatively long period of time. Here again, we see the
importance of tradition, in this case a tradition of inequality
and servility. Under such conditions, princely power is needed
to restrain and control arrogant men who think they are above 
8 2all laws. For these reasons, Machiavelli advises founders
to organize a princedom, not a republic, where the matter is
so corrupt that "the laws are not restraint enough" and a
king is needed to "check the over-great ambition and corrup-
8 3tion of the powerful." To set up a republic in such cir­
cumstances, a founder would have to use extreme and cruel
8 4measures, including eliminating the existing "gentlemen."
And in Machiavelli's opinion, few men possess both the abil-
8 5ity and the will to use such harsh measures. Moreover, 
where corruption is so widespread and ingrained in men by
SOlbid., I, 17, p. 239; 55, p. 308; A Discourse on Re­
modeling the Government of Florence, p. 106.
^Ipiscourses, I, 17, p. 240.
82ibid., 18, p. 243.
8 3 i b i d . , 55, p . 309 -
84ibid., 17, p. 240; 55, p. 309; A Discourse on Remodel
ing the Government of Florence, pp. 106-107.
8 scourse s , I, 17, p. 240; 55, pp. 309-310.
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customs and habits, one m a n ’s lifetime is too short a time in
which to restore civic spirit in a people; such people will
easily revert back to some form of servility after the founder
is dead, because they are used to being ruled and cared for
by lords and kings and lack the desire, confidence, and abil
8 6ity to be active citizens. As a general rule, then, Machia­
velli tells us that it is extremely difficult to reform a 
people and establish a lasting republic where the matter is
greatly corrupted, servility is a way of life, and people
8 7are used to living with great inequality. Of course, lesser
degrees of corruption exist, but even where the matter is not
yet corrupted, it is difficult to set up and maintain a repub-
8 8lie when a people is accustomed to the rule of princes.
On the other hand, Machiavelli argues that where there
is great equality, the matter is well suited for republican
government. Under such conditions, it is extremely difficult
8 9to establish a lasting princedom. The reason for this is 
that such peoples have experienced a long tradition of living 
under their own laws rather than the rule of princes. Inter-
^^Ibid., 16, p. 235; 17, p. 238.
^^Ibid., 55, pp. 309-310; A Discourse on Remodeling the
Government of Florence, pp. 106-10 7
O QDiscourses, I 
p p . 13-14; 5, p. 24.
^^Discourses, I ____
ing the Government of Florence, pp. 106-107
^^ , 16, p. 235; The Prince, 2, p. 12; 3, 
, 55, pp. 309-310; A Discourse on Remodel-
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estingly enough, one of Machiavelli's strongest statements 
regarding the strength and endurance of such a tradition of 
liberty can be found in chapter 5 of The Prince, which is 
entitled, "How States or Principalities are to be Managed 
That, Before They Were Conquered, Lived Under Their Own 
Laws":
And he who becomes master of a city used to 
being free and does not destroy her can ex- 
pect to be destroyed by her, because always 
she has as apretext in rebellion the name of 
liberty and her old customs, which never 
through either length of time or benefits 
are forgotten. And in spite of anything that 
can be done or foreseen, unless citizens are 
disunited or dispersed, they do not forget 
that name and those institutions, and in any 
emergency instantly they run back to them, as 
Pisa did a hundred years after she had been 
reduced to servitude by the Florentines . . .
in republics there is more life, more hate, 
greater longing for revenge; they are not 
permitted to rest-- nor can they be--by the 
recollection of their ancient liberty; so 
the surest way is to wipe them out or to live 
among them.^0
Advice such as this, of course, seems aimed at helping a ruth­
less prince to understand the need to conquer and destroy re­
publican governments, and one might wonder why Machiavelli 
could so easily give advice to tyrant and republican alike. 
But there is an essential continuity between the Discourses 
and The Prince with regard to his views on the strength and 
endurance of republican institutions, customs, and habits.
^^The Prince, 5, p. 24.
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And whether or not one likes his moral posture, he was primar­
ily interested in discovering the ways and means of ensuring 
political stability and durability in a constantly changing 
milieu; so he was very much interested in the conditions which 
tend to erode or to sustain different forms of government.
Where there is great equality, the only way to establish
a lasting princedom is to make "gentlemen" where none exist,
91that is, to bring about great inequality. In practical 
terms, this means setting up nobles who possess prince-like 
power over people, nobles with "castles and possessions,"
"property and m.en, " "walled towns and boroughs," "arms" and
9 2"followers." For no princedom can be stable and lasting
if the prince lacks such support:
A prince alone, lacking a nobility, cannot 
support the weight of a princedom; for that 
reason it is necessary that between him and 
the generality of the people there should 
be a middle group that will help him sup­
port it .
France, the best organized kingdom of his day, in Machiavelli*s 
opinion, was so constituted.^^ But this is not the best alter­
native, because one would have to be ruthless and cruel, and
^^Discourses, I, 55, p. 309; A Discourse on Remodeling 
the Government of Florence, p. 107.
^^Ibid.
^^A Discourse on Remodeling the Government of Florence,
p. 107; see also. Discourses, I, 55, p. 309.
^ ‘̂A Discourse on Remodeling the Government of Florence,
p. 107.
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even then, success is never assured, since one man's lifetime
9 5is too short to fully corrupt a people. So MachiaveHi 
advises would-be founders to establish republics under such 
conditions, if they want to ensure the continued survival 
of their regime for a long time.
In summary, to Machiavelli, the appropriate form of 
government is really dependent upon the condition of the 
people involved. Moreover, the founding act is extremely 
important and should be carried out by one man who possesses 
absolute power. The next chapter will deal with his concept 
of republican government, one possible outcome of the 
founder's work.
^^Discourses, III, 8, p. 451.
^^Ibid., I, 5 5, pp. 309-310; A Discourse on Remodeling 
the Government of Florence, pp. 106-107.
CHAPTER III
AN ANATOMY OF A TRUE REPUBLIC:
^iACHIAVELLI ' S MIXED STATE
Unlike most political theorists, Machiavelli did not 
seek to eliminate conflict within the political community. 
Even more remarkable, he believed that certain forms of con­
flict can be a positive force in strengthening republics.
Machiavelli took no pleasure in the aggressive side of 
m a n ’s nature, frequently lamenting the misery that it caused 
mankind.  ̂ But when he looked to history for solutions to 
m a n ’s political ills and observed the political struggles of 
his own time, he was struck with the persistence and perva­
siveness of conflict in human affairs. He thought that men
delude themselves if they think a conflict-free society is
2possible in this world.
As noted above, he concluded that men are essentially 
the same, possessing the same passions, in all ages. And 
of all human passions, he was most impressed with the impact 
of human ambition on political affairs. He saw ambition--
See, e.g.. Tercets on Ambition, pp. 735-739; also in 
Lust and Liberty: The Poems of Machiavelli, trans. Joseph 
Tusiani (New York: Ivan Obolensky, Inc., 1963), pp. 120-127.
^The Prince, 15, pp. 57-58; Discourses, I, 6, pp. 20 7- 
211; The History of Florence, VII, 1, pp. 1336-1337.
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in the sense of ardent desire for personal gain, advancement, 
or preferment--as the primary cause of both internal conflicts 
within political communities and external clashes between
3states. He believed that ambition is so deeply rooted and 
ingrained in the hearts and minds of men that it is beyond 
appeal to reason. At best, it can be temporarily controlled 
and directed through the personal power of an absolute ruler 
or through the impersonal constraints of institutions.
For Machiavelli, internal political conflict primarily 
takes the form of dissension between two classes or kinds of 
men that exist in all cities: the most important or leading
men of a city and the rest of the people.^ He assumes that 
there will always be a relatively few men who attain or in­
herit a leading economic and social stature in a city, above 
the vast majority of people. It has been suggested that the 
distinction Machiavelli makes between the few leading men of 
a city and the rest of the people is primarily psychological, 
rather than economic, resulting as it were from the excep­
tional ambition of a minority of men, as compared to the rest 
of the populace.  ̂ Mach Lavelli does emphasize the arrogance
^See, e.g.. Discourses, I, 3, pp. 201-202; 4, pp. 202-204;
5, pp. 204-206; 6, p. 210; 37, p. 272; 46, p. 290; II, 9, p. 347,
Tercets on Ambition, pp. 735-7 39, also in Lust and Liberty,
pp. 120 t 127; The |Golden] A s s , chapter 5, pp. 761 764, also in
Lust and Liberty, pp. 76-81; Familiar Letters, No. 131, p. 919»
^Discourses, I, 4, p. 203; 5, p. 204; The Prince, 9,
p. 39; The History of Florence, II, 12, p. 1093.
^On this point, see Neal Wood, "The Value of Asocial 
Sociability: Contributions of Machiavelli, Sidney and
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o£ the rich and their strong desire to dominate and oppress 
other people, as compared to the people, who primarily wish 
to be free from the domination and oppression of the few and 
to secure their own lives, families, and properties.  ̂ More­
over, even among the people, at any given time, there will 
be a small minority of men who also aspire to rule, if only
7given the opportunity. However, it seems just as likely 
that Machiavelli would have attributed differences of ambi 
tion to social environment or social conditioning, as much 
as to any natural, psychological differences among men. In 
any case, he never concerned himself with that question. The 
important point for Machiavelli is that such socio-economic 
differences do exist and that there is a continuous opposi 
tion between the desires of the few, who wish to dominate 
and oppress others, and the desires of the many, who long 
for security and the freedom to enjoy their families and 
relatively meager possessions.
Montesquieu,” Machiavelli and the Nature of Political Thought, 
ed. Martin Fleisher (New York; Atheneum, 1972), p. 289; Martin 
Fleisher, "A Passion for Politics: The Vital Core of the 
World of Machiavelli,” ibid., p. 132; James Burnham, The Mach­
iavellians: Defenders of Freedom (A Gateway Edition; Chicago: 
Henry Regnery Company, 1963), pp. 57-58, 65-66; Marcia L. 
Colish, "The Idea of Liberty in Machiavelli,” The Journal of 
The History of Ideas, Vol. XXXII, No. 3 (1971), 343; and 
Neal Wood, "Niccolo Machiavelli,” International Encyclopedia 
of the Social Sciences, ed. David L. Sills^ TX (1968), p. 508 .
^The Prince, 9, pp. 39-40; 19, p. 70; Discourses, I, 5, 
pp. 204-205 ; 16, p. 237.
Discourses, I, 16, p. 237.
According to Machiavelli, men in general share an insa­
tiable desire for worldly possessions and honors. Since there 
is always more to gain and since men are never satisfied with 
what they have, these cravings breed never-ending discontent,
Oas well as dissension, conflict, and warfare among men.
Beyond their own lives, Machiavelli argues that men are 
most concerned about retaining their honor and their proper­
ties. He warns princes to refrain from seizing or destroying 
either one, because he believes that unless men are killed 
they will always seek revenge for such injuries at the first
Qopportunity. Above all, however, Machiavelli believes that 
men esteem property. Hence, he warns princes to refrain from 
the "property of others, because men forget more quickly the 
death of a fatlier than the loss of a father's estate," in 
part because men can hope to regain property but cannot bring 
back the dead.^*^ Similarly, in tlie quarrels between the 
Roman nobles and the people, he notes that the nobles yielded 
positions of honor to the people without "great disturbances" 
but "when they came to property, so great was their obstinancy 
in defense that the people, to satisfy its appetite, had re­
course to" illegal methods.
8see, e.g.. Discourses, I, 37, p. 272; 46, p. 290; II, 
Preface, p. 323; The History of Florence, VII, 14, p. 1355.
9The Prince, 19, p. 67; Discourses, III, 6, pp. 429-450.
lOphe Prince, 17, pp. 62-63.
llDiscourse s , I, 37, pp. 274-275.
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In Machiavelli's view, then, raen are never fully satis­
fied with their present condition. The rich fear the loss 
of their possessions and honors, never feeling secure unless 
they are continually gaining more of the same, just as men
of the people are never satisfied with what they currently 
12possess. If anything, a m a n ’s ambition grows and intensi­
fies as he acquires more worldly possessions and honors. 
Ultimately, the rich seek to rule other men as a means of 
securing their wealth and of attaining a rank commensurate 
with their self-image of their own worth.
Individually, the richest men in a community can cause
greater disturbances than the people, because of their
1 3greater material resources. However, collectively, the
people represent no less a force to contend with, but they
are a force of a different sort. Their strength lies in
numbers, not in riches. Machiavelli clearly warns rulers
and v/ould-be rulers not to ignore or underestimate the fury
1 Sof the people. On the one hand, most men of the people 
will be temporarily satisfied and contented if they are 
allowed to keep and to enjoy what properties they have ac-
12 Ibid., I, S, p. 205; 37, pp. 272-274; 46, p. 290.
^^Ibid., I, 5, p. 206.
14The Prince, 9, p. 40; 19, p. 71; Discourses, I, 6,
p p . 20 7-211.
^^The Prince, 2, p. 12; 7, p. 31; 8, p. 38; 9, pp. 40- 
41; 16, p. 61; 17, pp. 62-63; 19, pp. 67-76; 20, p. 80; 24, 
p. 88; Discourses, I, 40, pp. 283-284.
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quired and if their honor is not insulted or i n j u r e d . O n  
the other hand, the desire of the people to be free from op­
pression is at least as strong as the desire of the rich to
17oppress the people. At least while still uncorrupted, the
people will react violently against oppression or the threat
of oppression. If the rich abuse the people, the people will
try to plunder the rich for revenge or to secure and enjoy
the same possessions, honors, and offices once held only by
18the upper class. The people need leadership and direction;
otherwise, their anger may be spent on ineffective riots.
But where there is great discontent among the people, there
will usually be ambitious men, available to lead the people
2 0against their oppressors.
The incessant influence of human ambition, along with
such related passions as hatred, envy, and pride, also means
that warfare between states is all but inevitable, except in
21unique and generally unattainable circumstances. There­
fore, in order to survive in such a hostile world, the indi­
vidual state must be prepared to defend itself against exter-
^^The Prince, 19, p. 67.
^^Discourses, I, 5, pp. 204-206.
ISibid., p. 206.
191t)icl. , 44, p. 287; 57, pp. 312-313.
ZOfhe Prince, 9, p. 39; 19, p. 68; Discourses, I, 2, pp. 
197-198; 40, pp. 282-283; 57, pp. 312-313; III, 28, pp. 492-493
^^Discourses, I, 6, pp. 210-211.
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nal aggressors. At the same time, however, each state must 
cope with internal conflict that can potentially enervate 
a people, increasing the likelihood of subjugation to an 
external foe who is better equipped to fight. Given these 
conditions, Machiavelli arrived at a disturbing conclusion: 
the best assurance of long survival for a state lies in re­
directing the ambition of men within the political community
2 2outward, toward and against other states. Although a more 
defensive posture may be effective under certain circumstances, 
as a general rule, Machiavelli concludes that it is far better 
to embark upon an intentional course of expansion.
Deliberate expansionism is desirable, in Machiavelli's 
view, for several reasons. For one thing, a state that main­
tains a relatively small population and land area is likely 
to be forced to expand by some external enemy or other unfore -
2 3seen circumstances beyond its control. If that happens,
such a state would not have adequate human resources to cope 
with such growth. In pure military terms, it would not
have enough soldiers to conquer and hold new lands. Such 
states should avoid expansion, if at all possible, for growth 
would eventually lead to ruin and defeat at the hands of a
^^See ibid., pp. 209-211; Tercets on Ambition, pp. 735- 
739; also in Lust and Liberty, pp. 120-127.
^^Discourses, I, 6, pp. 207-211.
2"^Ibid.
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stronger opponent. By welcoming population increases and
aggressively seeking hegemony over more lands and peoples,
a state is more likely to survive longer than if it sought
merely to maintain itself. Moreover, even if a small state
is left unmolested, it would be a mixed blessing, since a
long peace in itself is a cause of corruption and greater
2 5internal discords. In times of peace, the ambition that
was once turned against other peoples would be vented on
internal quarrels and dangerous divisions.
For another thing, deliberate expansionism will ensure
that positions of authority in a republic are given to the
most excellent and able men.^^ War and the threat of war,
and especially the fear of defeat and servitude, will force
men to seek out leaders who possess the wisdom and courage
to overcome all adversaries.
Besides, Machiavelli preferred the ancient, pagan
morality that emphasized the value of a vigorous, active life
and worldly accomplishments over the Christian religion of
his own time that taught men to think more of saving their
own souls than of fighting for their own glory and that of
27their cities in this world. He disliked the idle, passive.
2!)Ibid. , pp. 210-211.
It)ici. , III, 16, pp. 468-470 ; The Art of W a r , I, p. 
577; II, p. 623.
^^Discourses, II, 2, pp. 330-331.
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or contemplative life. He also believed that if good men
eschew political and military affairs, there will always be
plenty of evil men who will take matters into their own 
2 8hands. Expansion and warfare offer the best path to glory
for an individual and his city.
Finally, deliberate expansionism will focus the energies
of a people on overcoming common enemies, helping to minimize
the kind of internal quarrels that weaken rather than invigor- 
2 9ate a state. That is, assuming that a republic is properly 
organized to deal with the class conflict between leading men 
and the people, expansionism will help to eliminate the kind 
of factional strife that debilitates and destabilizes a state.
Paradoxically, even though a policy of deliberate expan­
sionism has a unifying effect on a republic, it will also in­
crease the frequency and intensity of internal dissensions
3 0between the rich and the people. In order to grow and con­
quer other peoples, a republic must allow substantial increases
in its population. The people represent the source of
32citizen-soldiers needed to build an empire. But as the
^^Ibid., P- 331.
^^Ibid., I, 1, PPp p . 498-501.
^°Ibid., I, 6 , p .
^^Ibid,, PP . 207-
^^Ibid., 5, 205 ;
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people grow in numbers and as they are called upon to make 
greater sacrifices on the battlefield for their city, they 
also gain more power by virtue of their numbers as well as 
their value to the republic in military terms. Hence, they 
have more reasons to dissent and to demand a greater voice 
in political and military affairs. If the population of a 
republic is kept small, internal discords between the rich 
and the people can be managed easier, but for the reasons 
given above, that is not the best alternative.
For Machiavelli, the early Roman Republic represented 
the best example of a state that opted for growth and expan­
sion. He attributed the strength and longevity of that 
republic to the mixed nature of that regime, which incor­
porated all three simple forms of government, in the
Aristotelian tradition: princedom, aristocracy, and popu- 
% ?lai rule. In theory, he argues that such a government
is more stable, slower to corrupt, and longer lasting than
other kinds of republics.
As noted above, the founding act was extremely impbr-
5 5tant in Machiavelli’s political theory. Ideally, he
believed that it is best for one man to seize absolute power
^^Ibid., I, 2, pp. 200-201.
^'^Ibid. , I, 2, pp. 195-201; 3, pp. 201-202 ; 4, pp. 202- 
204; 5, pp. 204-206; 6, pp. 207-211.
^^See pp. 26-27 above.
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to found or reform a g o v e r n m e n t . B u t  even the Roman Repub­
lic was not organized into a mixed regime all at once by one 
3 7man. Instead, Rome had a succession of early kings who 
established laws and institutions compatible with a repub­
lican way of life, even though their intentions were to 
found and maintain a kingdom. Machiavelli praised Romulus, 
the first Roman king, for limiting his own authority in
creating the Roman Senate "with which he could consult and
3 8according to the opinion of which he would decide." Since 
Romulus supposedly only reserved for himself "command of the 
armies, when war was decided on, and the power to assemble 
the Senate," these "first arrangements" were "more in con­
formity with a constitution free and according to law than
39with one that was absolute and tyrannical." And following 
Romulus, Rome was fortunate in having a king, Numa Pompilius, 
who introduced religious practices which fostered honorable 
conduct and obedience to the laws among an as yet savage 
people, and which made possible the kind of military training 
and sacrifices necessary to strengthen and expand the state. 
So these early Roman kings established laws, customs, and in­
stitutions quite compatible with a republican way of life.
^^See Discours es , I, 2, p. 196. 
^^Ibid.
38ibid., 9, p. 219.
3 9 i b i d .
40jbid., 11, pp. 223-226.
59
In some respects, Machiavelli judged both princedoms 
and republics by the same criteria, as when he said that the 
"principle foundations of all states, the new as well as the 
old and the mixed, are good laws and good armies. Mach­
iavelli's emphasis on good military organization is well 
known. He devoted much of his writings to military matters 
and frequently suggested that without good military institu­
tions, good laws and good government cannot exist. And 
he strongly advocated armies made up of republican citizens 
or princely sub j ects , rather than those composed of merce­
naries or auxiliaries, which he considered untrustworthy and 
dangerous to the stability and survival of any state.^^ His 
message regarding the importance of the military is quite 
clear. One reason why the military is crucial to political 
stability and endurance has already been mentioned: all cities 
and governments exist in a world of conflict and aggression, 
so they must be prepared to defend themselves. Additionally, 
military training and discipline will strengthen the moral 
character and vigor of a people, temporarily helping to pre-
'̂ T̂he Prince, 12, p. 47.
^^Ibid. ; Discours es, I, 4, p. 202 ; III, 31, p. 500; The 
Art of War, Preface, p. 566; The History of Florence, II, 5, 
pp. 1085-1086.
^^The Prince, 12, pp. 46-51; 13, pp. 51-55; Discourses, 
I, 43, p. 286; II, 20, pp. 381-383; 30, pp. 409 -412 ;
Art of War, I, pp. 568-595; VII, pp. 722-723; The History of 
Florence, I, 39, pp. 1078-1079; IV, 15, p. 1203; V, 33, pp. 
TTTITTZFO; VI, 1, pp. 1284-1285 ; 20, pp. 1307-1310.
6 0
vent the onset of corruption.
Early in the Discourses, Machiavelli states that since 
"men act either through necessity or through choice, and be­
cause ability appears the more where choice has less power," 
a builder of a city ought to consider whether a barren site 
is best to force men to work hard, to prevent laziness, and 
to lessen dissensions.^^ He then concludes that a barren 
site would be best only if men did not seek to dominate 
others and suggests that it is wiser to build a city on a 
fertile site, so that it will have adequate resources to de­
fend itself or to extend its dominion by attacking other 
s t a t e s . B u t  if a builder avoids a barren country, what 
will make men work for the good of the city? Machiavelli 
offers a man-made substitute: well-arranged laws that "will 
force upon her those necessities which the site does not 
force upon her . . . Even more significant, such laws,
if properly conceived, can be more effective in producing 
good soldiers and good citizens than a naturally barren 
c o u n t r y . A  city can have adequate resources with which 
to expand and grow, while the laws force upon men the 
necessities of military training and other rigorous activi-
^^Discourses, I, 1, p- 19 3 
^^Ibid., p. 194.
^^Ibid.
"^^Ibid.
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ties that tend to prevent corruption.
Thus, good laws and good military institutions go hand 
in hand. To prevent laziness, dysfunctional conflicts, and 
disobedience to the laws, rigorous military training is es­
sential. At the same time, good laws are essential to 
ensure that military training is introduced and continued 
during the life of a state. And, as noted above in the 
case of the Roman state, good religious practices are equally 
important in fostering obedience to the laws and adherence to 
strict military discipline.
Machiavelli conceived of two constitutions that would be 
most stable and longlasting: a "true" republic, of a kind
4 8patterned after the Roman Republic, and a "true" princedom.
He never fully developed his concept of a true princedom in 
terms of institutional arrangements. However, he did say 
that such a regime would be stable only where there is great 
inequality of the kind discussed in chapter 2. That is, the 
people would have to be slavisn, more used to obeying than 
participating as active citizens in civic affairs, and there 
would have to be "gentlemen," who possess great wealth, es­
pecially in the form of landholdings, and who help to support 
a king by exercising command over subjects within their juris­
diction. As noted in chapter 2, Machiavelli viewed such a
'^^A Dis course on Remodeling the Government of Florence,
p . 106.
62
condition of inequality as being synonymous with extensive 
political corruption and a lack of capacity among people for 
a free or republican mode of life. Given such conditions, 
he suggests that it would be extremely difficult to institute 
anything but a princedom. A king is needed to control the 
"gentlemen" and protect the people from their arrogant de­
sires to dominate and oppress, and the people are so used 
to obeying that they cannot begin to participate in civic 
affairs.
Nevertheless, even under such conditions of inequality 
and servitude, a viable and strong state may be founded, if 
laws and customs provide for the needs and security of all 
classes of me n . Machiavelli thought that the French king­
dom of his time exemplified this sort of government, with 
its parliaments that supposedly helped to restrain the rich 
and protect the poor, and a king who was also subject to the 
customs and laws of the land, retaining absolute power only 
in military affairs.
Machiavelli suggests that the early Roman kings had in­
tended to found an enduring kingdom. This they failed to do, 
because the Roman people were not corrupted or slavish, even 
at the time of the Tarquins, and because they fostered 
equality, rather than inequality, in the very laws, customs.
^^See, e.g.. The Prince, 19, pp. 67-76; Discourses, I, 
4, p p . 202 - 204.
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and institutions they introduced. Moreover, the early Roman 
kingdom suffered from a weakness inherent in all hereditary 
princedoms, namely, the tendency of a prince’s heirs to be­
come corrupt and to t y r a n n i z e . T a r q u i n i u s  Superbus, a suc­
cessor to the Roman kingship, broke "the laws of tlie kingdom" 
and governed "tyrannically . . . Tarquinius "took all
authority away from the Senate and transferred it to himself ; 
and such business as had been carried on in public places
with the approval of the Roman Senate, he had carried on in
5 2his own palace, thus bringing or himself blame and envy."
As a result, the Roman people, as yet untouched by the cor­
ruption of their kings, rose up under the leadership of 
powerful men and drove the Tarquins from the city. Such is 
the fate of a king who breaks the laws and customs of his 
native land. Conversely, Machiavelli saw little difficulty 
for a hered.i tary king to maintain his position so long as 
he conducts himself according to the "customs of his fore-
C 7fathers. . . The problem is that however good a king
may be, his heirs will eventually step outside the customary 
bounds of tradition, toward a life of lust and luxury. If 
that happens while a people is still uncorrupted, a prince 
will probably lose his position, as happened in Rome when the
S O p i s c o u r s e s , I, 2, p p .  197-198; 17, p ,  238.
S l l b i d . ,  Ill, 5, p .  427.
5 2 i b i d .
5 3 p b e  P r i n c e ,  2, p .  12; c f .  D i s c o u r s e s , III, 5, p p .  427
428.
64
Tarquins were banished. But if that happens when a people 
is corrupt, even if the king is driven from the city, a new 
prince will probably take over power, for such a people has 
little or no capacity for establishing and maintaining a 
republican form of government. This was the case with Rome 
after the time of Caesar.
Thus, princedoms are inherently unstable, since they 
largely depend upon one man and his heirs, who are bound to 
eventually become corrupted. If a people is corrupted as 
well, however, it will'take more than the fall of a wicked 
prince to regenerate an active, republican citizenry. Re­
publics are inherently more stable than princedoms because 
they depend on many men for their maintenance, men who can 
neither agree on basic changes in government nor an abandon­
ing of their treasured way of life. This is why, as noted 
earlier in chapter 2, it is necessary for one man to impose 
his will on all others to refoim such a government.
In the early Roman kingdom, the kings were gradually 
becoming corrupt, despite many good laws and customs insti­
tuted by Romulus and other early kings, and this corruption 
would have spread, with an enervating effect, to all the 
people of Rome, if the Tarquins had not been driven from 
the city.^^ Instead, the Roman people, as yet uncorrupted
^^Discourses, 1, 17, p. 2 39.
^^Ibid., I, 17, p. 238.
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and unwilling to live in servility under a tyrant, drove the 
Tarquins away and vowed never to live under a king again.
To their credit, however, the Roman nobles set up two 
Consuls to take the place of the king. In other words, they 
institutionalized princely power in the form of two Consuls, 
who were to be adopted or selected by the Senate to serve for
a limited term of office.
With the expulsion of the Roman kings, then, Rome became 
a mixture of princedom, institutionalized in the Consulate, 
and aristocracy, institutionalized in the S e n a t e . A t  that 
time, however, there was no "popular part of the government" 
for the large and growing number of common people. Thus, a 
"true" republic did not yet exist in Rome.
Even under the Roman kings, Rome had a policy of increas-
S 7ing its population. Hence, a relatively large populace 
already existed at the time the Tarquins were driven from the 
city, and as noted above, Machiavelli believed that as the
people grow in numbers and are called upon to serve their city
in new w ars, they become more vocal and demand a greater share 
in government and the booty of warfare. Since they risk their 
lives for the city, they come to feel that they should have 
more influence in political and military affairs. So there 
already existed in Rome a basis for popular unrest and discord
^^Ibid., I , 2, p . 200. 
^^Ibid., II, 3, p. 334.
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The people were already powerful, by virtue of their numbers 
and t'le importance of their role in Roman warfare.
It is apparent that Machiavelli viewed mixed government 
in d)nam-,c terms, unlike his predecessors, including Aristotle, 
who viewed mixed government essentially in static terms, i.e., 
in terms of established functions, authorities, or roles. 
Machiavelli certainly viewed the creation of the Roman Consul- 
ate in dynamic terms: the princely part of the Roman Republic 
came into being as the result of the reaction of a proud and 
independent people against the tyrannical abuses of the Tar­
quins. Even more interesting, he thought the "popular part" 
of the Roman Republic came into being because of the conflict 
between the noble class and the much larger class of common 
people. Thus, he took a novel and remarkable position, argu­
ing that class conflict actually strengthened the Roman state 
by bringing about the development of a "true" republic.
When the Tarquins were driven from Rome, the nobles were 
released from the constraints placed upon them by the Roman 
kings, who tended to protect the people from oppression and 
abuse at the hands of the nobles. While the Tarquins re­
mained in Rome, the nobles treated the people kindly for fear 
that the people would rise up against them in full support of
r Othe Tarquin king. Once the Tarquins were gone, however, the
^^Ibid., 1 , 3 ,  pp. 201-202.
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nobles began to vent their true feelings on the people, seek­
ing to dominate and oppress t h e m . A s  a result, the people 
rose up to fight for their own security, freedom from oppres­
sion, and a greater voice in civic a f f a i r s . T o  their 
credit, the Roman nobles recognized the power of the people, 
as well as their value as a source of manpower for Roman 
armies, and gave the people a greater share in government, 
as much to avoid losing their own position in government as 
for any other reason.
The people’s share in government was institutionalized 
in the form of Tribunes of the People, who served a similar 
function as had the Roman kings, to protect the people from 
the excessive arrogance of the n o b l e s . T h e y  served as 
spokesmen for the people. Without a head, or leader, the 
people cannot effectively express their concerns about pro­
posed laws or actions. The Tribunes provided the means to 
express their assent or dissent regarding political and mili­
tary affairs. Machiavelli is very clear on his feelings 
regarding this development: he thought that "every city ought 
to have methods with which the people can express their ambi­
tion, and especially those cities that intend to make use of
^^Ibid.
^^Ibid., 2, p. 200.
^^Ibid.
^^Ibid., 3, p. 202 ; 4, p. 204.
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the people in important affairs." He approved of the Roman 
method by which "when the people wished to secure a law," 
they either rioted, closed up their businesses, left the city, 
or refused to go to war. Consequently, the nobles would have 
to find some way to pacify or to satisfy the people. Machia­
velli took the position that whenever the people demand a new 
law or some other change in government, it is usually justified 
by actual or probable o p p r e s s i o n . M o r e o v e r ,  he believed 
that there are usually remedies that the nobles can apply when 
the people are mistaken, as for example the use of assemblies, 
in which some dignified and noble man, respected and trusted 
by all, can persuade the people of their error.
Obviously, Machiavelli did not lei'eve that good laws 
are enough to restrain the ambitions of t]ie rich. In the 
Spartan republic, the nobles were restrained by the kings, 
who were chosen for 1ife. In the Roman Republic, it was 
also necessary that there be some force to counteract the 
natural tendencies of the nobles to oppress and rule other 
people. The authority of the Tribunes, with the power of the 
people behind them, served this purpose. And without the 
incessant and ever-increasing demands of the people for more 
authority, more honors, and more wealth, Rome would have been
^^Ibid., 4, p. 203. 
^"^Ibid.
^^Ibid., 6, p. 208.
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ruined much faster by the excessive ambition of the nobles.
With the establishment of the Tribunate, the Roman state 
became a "true" republic, since it then included a mixture of 
all three forms of government. The nobles continued to hold 
their share of government in the Senate, and they also re­
tained effective control over the Consulate or princely func­
tion of government.
But with the establishment of Tribunes, class conflict 
did not end in Rome. On the contrary, class conf]ict con­
tinued to one extent or another throughout the life of the 
Roman Republic, right up to the time of the Gracchi, when 
revival of the controversial Agrarian Laws led to even more 
serious armed conflict between classes and the eventual dis­
solution of the Republic into factional strife and tyranny 
at the hands of Caesar. And from the time of the Tarquins 
to the time of tne Gracchi, Machiavelli believed that the 
Roman Republic benefited from class conflict.
Machiavelli*s suggestions that conflict within the polit­
ical community itself could prove beneficial was an unprece­
dented and novel idea. In a sense, he viewed each class of 
men as separate but interacting communities within the city, 
each group seeking to satisfy its own desires. But he attrib­
uted Rome’s very greatness to her internal dissensions. This
^^Ibid., I, 37, pp. 272-275 
^^Ibid.
70
is îiost evident in chapter 4 of Book I, Discourses, which is 
encitled, "The Discord Between The People And The Roman Senate 
Made That Republic Free And Powerful. As previously men­
tioned, he thought Rome was made more powerful because such 
conflict brought about the creation of a "true" republic, a 
mixed regime that channeled the energies of all classes in a 
concerted drive for world hegemony. A true republic provides 
for a share in government for both classes of men, and the 
mutual distrust and conflict between them actually serves to 
prevent domination by either the rich or by the people.
Machiavelli believed that a certain measure of class in­
equality or civic inequality, in terms of function or rank, 
is essential for the stability of a republic. As an example, 
he attributed the downfall of the republican government that 
held power in Florence from 1495 to 1512 to the fact that it 
did not satisfy the most important citizens in the city. In 
other words, the leading citizens were not given the high 
political offices and hence the rank they thought they de­
served, and that caused serious factional quarrels and other 
disturbances which led to the failure of that r e g i m e . I n  
contrast, the Roman Republic did provide a share in government 
for both classes, while still preserving distinctions of rank
^^Ibid. , 4, pp. 202-204.
Discourse on Remodeling the Government of Florence, 
pp. 10 7 - 10
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and function between the nobles and the people. Machiavelli
saw two extreme situations which tend to preclude a mixed
government of the Roman kind. On the one hand, there is the
extreme of too much civic inequality, when a few citizens
become like "gentlemen" and attain prince-like power over
people. On the other hand, there is the extreme of too much
civic equality, as in the case of Florence in Machiavelli’s
time. For Florence had never been organized to ensure the
contentment of "those elements that must be contented if
70republics are not to fall." He meant that some of the 
most important men of Florence -- important by virtue of their 
wealth, prestige, and influence--were not given a proper 
rank in the formal political structure of the city. They 
were not given the kind of governmental offices they thought 
they deserved. As a result, they were either frustrated in 
their attempts to influence affairs, or worse yet, they in­
fluenced affairs in extra legal, uncontrollable, and disrup­
tive ways. Machiavelli believed that if such men are given 
their proper rank in a republic, they are more likely to 
work together for the good of the city than for their own 
personal causes. By institutionalizing their power, he be­
lieved that such men would be subject to the laws and customs 
of a city and would be less likely to resort to private re­
sources to influence affairs. It was necessary and wise that
^^Ibid., p. 101.
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the Roman nobles conceded more power to the people. In doing 
so, however, they retained their dignity, prestige, rank, and 
authority in the Roman Senate. Moreover, the Roman nobles 
were equal to each other as citizens of Rome, possessing as 
a class a common rank in that republic; but individually, none 
possessed the power or status characteristic of "gentlemen," 
at least so long as that republic remained incorrupt.
Above all, however, Rome became powerful by harnessing 
the power of the people. She could not have built such a 
great empire without allowing great increases in her popula­
tion and welcoming foreigners as citizens. Nor could she 
have done so vitliout yielding to the demands of the people 
for a greater share in governmental affairs.
Machiavelli also said that the discord between the 
nobles and the people in Rome made that republic "free." In 
fact, he goes so far as to say that, in all republics, "laws
7 ]made in favor of liberty" are brought about by such discord. 
The concept of liberty or freedom is centra] to Machiavelli's 
political theory. But what does he mean by liberty? There 
has never been a genera] consensus among students of Machia­
vel li on the meaning he ascribes to this term.
To begin with, Machiavelli was preoccupied with ways to 
establish stable political regimes that last a long time.
^^Discourses, I, 4, p. 203.
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Moreover, he advocated regimes based upon the rule of laws, 
customs, and institutions, rather than those governed by the 
whims of an absolute, personal ruler. This is true, despite 
his insistence on the necessity for absolute, personal rule 
in founding or reforming a government. Regimes which are 
maintained by the absolute, personal rule of a tyrant are 
neither stable nor free in Machiavelli’s eyes. Yet he does 
sometimes apply the term liberty to princedoms, as well as 
republics. How can we account for this? For one thing, 
Machiavelli could conceive of princedoms in which the king's 
power is limited by custom to military affairs. In such 
regimes, even the king would be subservient to the laws and 
institutional processes of the land. In addition, he vis­
ualized a situation in which all classes of men, rich and 
poor alike, are satisfied because of good laws, customs, and 
institutions that control and channel individual ambition in 
beneficial ways. Thus, in one sense, even princedoms can be 
free, if they are governed by fundamental laws and institu­
tions that prevent any one individual or class of men from 
dominating other men. He thought the early Roman kingdom 
possessed some measure of liberty in this regard, until
Tarquinius Superbus "deprived Rome of all the liberty which
7 2under the other kings she had preserved." He also thought 
the French kingdom of his own day possessed some measure of
^^Ibid., I I I , 5, p. 427.
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liberty in this sense of the term. In somewhat negative
terms, that fail to do justice to the dynamic side of class
conflict in his theory, he provides us with the following
definition of freedom and stable government:
I allow that when it comes about [and it sel­
dom does come about) that by a city’s good 
fortune a wise, good and powerful citizen 
gains power, who establishes laws that repress 
strife between the nobles and the people or so
restrain these parties that they cannot do evil,
at such a time a city can be called free and
her government can be considered firm and solid;
being founded on good laws and good institutions, 
it does not need, as do other governments, the 
strength and wisdom of one man to maintain it.73
This definition is flexible enough to fit more than one form 
of government, and in fact, Machiavelli did not mean to re­
serve the term liberty for only one kind of regime. By this 
definition, some princedoms can be considered free, as can 
various kinds of republics. For example, Machiavelli believed 
that Athens had a defective constitution, because it was 
governed by the people and did not provide for a share or
rank in government for leading citizens. As a result, in
a very short time Pis istratus usurped all power and ruled 
as a tyrant in Athens. Nevertheless, Machiavelli tells us 
that when Pisistratus’s heirs were driven out forty years 
later, Athens "returned to liberty," even though she again 
adopted a popular form of government that would not last
^^The History of Florence, IV, 1, p. 1187 
^^Discourses, I, 2, p. 199.
75
more than a hundred y e a r s . A t h e n s  could be called free, 
even though her constitution was defective, because she did 
prevent class tyranny for a time, through laws that restrained 
the rich and poor alike. In a negative sense, then, liberty 
for Machiavelli means the absence of personal or class tyranny. 
It means the restraint of each class, so that neither will 
have need to turn to one man for protection and so that neither 
will be so abused or oppressed that factional strife ensues.
But even a princedom that can be considered free in that 
sense cannot compare to the freedom found in republics. For 
Machiavelli, the freeing of a city from princely rule can 
have an animating effect. In the case of Athens, the demise 
of Pisistratus started that city on the way to considerable 
greatness in the space of one hundred years.^^ Even more 
remarkable, in the case of Rome, it unleashed a tremendous 
amount of human energy and a concerted drive for world hege­
mony. As a general rule, Machiavelli went so far as to say 
that ’’experience shows that cities never have increased in 
dominion or in riches except while they have been at liberty"
and that "it is very marvelous to observe what greatness Rome
7 7came to after she freed herself from her kings." Cities 
governed by citizens have a much greater capacity for growth
^^Ibid.
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7C
n othan cities subject to a prince- Machiavelli accounts for
this greater growth capacity in the concern of republican
citizens for the "common good," as compared to princes, who
are normally more concerned about their private good, which
seldom coincides with the welfare or betterment of all people 
79in a city. In a republic, more men can attain high offices
to develop and prove their abilities. With so many able and
experienced men active in public life, they tend to keep
watch over each other, lest anyone should accumulate too 
8 0much power. Citizens are as much concerned about prevent­
ing other individuals from gaining too much authority as 
they are concerned about their own status.
A prince will normally fear men of ability, who may 
consider themselves his equal or superior. He must maintain 
his superordinate position and reputation. Hence, he will 
fear those who may gain a reputation for wisdom or bravery. 
Although Machiavelli encouraged princes to foster economic 
and other activities and to honor men of excellence, he did 
not expect many to do so. Besides, to survive, a prince can 
only raise a limited number of men to the status of "gentle­
men," relegating the majority of men to a much more limited 
stature. To survive, he should alone lead his armies to war
^^Ibid., I, 58, p. 316. 
^^Ibid., II, 2, p. 329. 
^°Ibid., I, 30, p. 261.
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and should above all enhance his own reputation in victory, 
hhen a prince r.ialces new conquests, he does not benefit by 
sharing the fruits of his victory with the cities subject to 
him, i.e., with the citizens of those cities.
So long as people are not corrupted and slavish, a 
reservoir of human energies will be released when a city is 
set free from princely rule (or for that matter, from domina­
tion by another republic). This is because many more men are 
then able to idealize their ambitions and potential abilities. 
The conditions of such a free city are best described in 
Ma chi av e11i ’s own wo rds:
All cities and provinces that live in free­
dom anyivhere in the world, as I said above, 
make very great gains. They do so because 
their popiilations are larger, since marriages 
are freer and more attractive to men, and 
each man gladly begets those children he 
thinks he can bring up, without fear that 
his patrimony will be taken fiom him; he 
know^s not merely that they are born free 
and not slaves but that by means of their 
abilities they can become prominent men.
Riches multiply in a free country to a 
greater extent, both those that come from 
agriculture and those that come from in­
dustry, for each man gladly increases such 
things and seeks to gain such goods as he 
believes, when gained, he can enjoy.
Thence it comes that men in emulation give 
thought to private and public advantages; g2 
and both kinds keep marvelously increasing.
Machiavelli believed that, with rare exceptions, princes bring
^^Ibid., II, 2, p. 329; cf. The Art of War, II, pp. 621-
622.
^^Discourses, II, 2, pp. 332-333.
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uncertainty into the lives o£ people, noble and common alike. 
Some nobles may profit under a prince, but there will always 
be some who will not be favored. Moreover, whatever security 
a prince brings to the people, it is uncertain how long it 
will last. Even if a good prince is in power for a long 
time, one cannot be sure that his successor will also be good, 
Nor is it in the interest of a prince to foster population 
growth, economic advances, or expansion of political power 
for those cities subject to him. In a republic, on the other 
hand, personal glory is subordinated to the good of the city 
as a whole. All citizens share in the booty and the glor)'- of 
military victories. Republics tend to honor more men for 
their excellence in many fields of endeavor. They tend to 
advance laws and other policies that profit the majority of 
citizens, even when some individuals or small groups of men 
suffer as a result. Overall, more able men emerge in repub­
lics than in princedoms. Men can hope to better themselves 
and their families to a greater extent in republics. And 
they have less reason to fear that what they accumulate in 
riches or status will be taken away from them. In The Art 
of W ar, Machiavelli argues, through the commentary of 
Fabrizio, that ’’excellent men come in larger numbers from
republics than from kingdoms, since republics usually honor
8 3wisdom and bravery; kingdoms fear them." At best, princes
^^The Art of War, II, p. 62 2.
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may be forced to recognize able men, to some extent, under 
such conditions as once prevailed on the "continent of Europe,
when there were numerous republics that threatened their very
-  ̂ 84existence.
Liberty, then, in the highest sense of the term for 
Machiavelli, is the opposite of servitude of any kind. On 
an individual level, it means an independent spirit and a 
willingness to oppose vigorously any form of oppression, 
whether in the form of an individual tyrant or domination 
by one faction or class of men. A city is free, in the 
highest sense of the term, when its citizens have a strong 
aversion to servitude of any kind and when they are active 
in civic affairs. A city is free when its government is not 
dominated by one class of men, nor sustained by the wisdom or 
strength of only one man, whether a tyrant or just a citizen 
of some repute who has excessive influence over civic affairs. 
Only republics can be free in these terms.
If properly ordered, a republic will redirect private 
ambitions in publicly acceptable and beneficial ways. One 
way of doing this is to provide for a system of rewards and 
honors to recognize men who seek reputations through pub­
licly acceptable ways, which benefit the city as a whole and
8 5which preserve or expand a city's power and liberty. At
^^Ibid.
^^Discourses, III, 28, pp. 492-493; see also. The His 
tory o f Florence, VII, I, pp. 1336-1537.
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the same time, those who seek reputations and personaJ follow­
ings in private ways, which are injurious to the city as a 
whole, must be punished. Paradoxically, a republic needs 
"citizens of reputation" if it is to prosper and survive.
Yet "reputation gained by citizens is the cause of tyranny 
in republics. Machiavelli suggests that the answer to 
this dilemma lies in distinguishing between public and pri­
vate methods of gaining reputations and support. The former 
must be encouraged, but the latter must be discouraged. 
Ambition cannot be eliminated. So men must be given alterna­
tive ways of realizing their natural ambitions that strengthen 
rather than debilitate a republic. By the same token, men 
who seek to attain greatness through priva ::e favors and bene­
fits must be stopped before they gain too much power and too 
many partisans. Finally, to ensure personal commitment to 
the civic order, rewards and punishments must be administered
impartially and consistently, without regard for past deeds 
87or actions.
In addition, to prevent men from attaining too much 
power or reputation or from threatening free government in 
other ways, a republic should establish the right to bring 
charges or to make accusations before public officials or
^^Discourses, III, 28, p. 492.
^^Ibid., I , 24, pp. 251-252.
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the people. In Rome, the Tribunes of the People were not
only the popular part of that government; they also served
8 8to protect Roman "liberty." At least in a republic that 
opts for expansion and growth, in which the people have a 
share in government, it is best to place the "guardianship
8 9of liberty" in the hands of tlie people rather than the rich. 
The nobles have both the greater resources and greater de­
sire to seize more power, whereas the people have less re­
sources and must, of necessity, be most concerned about pre­
venting domination or oppression, either by one man or the 
nobles as a class. Moreover, so long as they are incorrupt, 
the people normally have good reason, for being concerned 
about oppression, whether real or imagined. Therefore, 
Machiavelli suggests that they will guard liberty better 
than the nobles, if only given proper means of doing so.
And one of the best means for doing so is to ensure the 
right to bring charges, as the Romans did through the Tribunes 
of the People. By this method, the people have a publicly
sanctioned, legal way to accuse those nobles whom they fear,
hate, or distrust. Hence, they will be less likely to resort
to unlawful means to vent their feelings and passions. More­
over, since all citizens know that their conduct may be sub-
^^Ibid., 4, p. 204. 
^^Ibid., 5, pp. 204-206. 
^°Ibid., 7, pp. 211-214.
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ject to public scrutiny and judgment by public officials or 
an assembly of the people, and that they may face punish­
ment for wrongdoing, they are not as likely to conduct 
themselves contrary to the good of the city. At the same 
time, slanders are harmful to republics, because they en­
gender hatred and fear. As a result, people start resorting 
to illegal means for protection and revenge. The right to 
bring charges is the best way to avoid s l a n d e r s . W h e n  
this is done, people know that slanderers will be subjected 
to open, public investigations, and that if they are found 
g u i l t y  of slandering, they will be punished. Thus, people 
will be less inclined to slander, and since legal accusations 
require proof, slanderers will be forced to remain silent or 
face punishment. As a result, people will not be accused 
under such conditions as much as they would be slandered if 
the right to bring charges did not exist. Overall, then, 
people will have much less reason to hate and fear their 
fellow citizens and will be less likely to resort to private 
revenge or other illegal means to protect their honor and 
reputations.
Since more able men emerge in republics, Machiavelli 
believed that republics are better able to adapt to the times 
than princedoms. The primary purpose of the princely func­
91 Ibid., 8, pp. 214-217.
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tion in Machiavelli's mixed government is to provide mi1i 
tary leadership through citizen g e n e r a l s . T h e  Roman Con­
suls served as citizen generals for a limited period of time,
after which they returned to their former civilian status 
. 9 3and profession. They held office for only one year. Yet 
they were better generals than most princes, because of their
Q Ôhigh civic spirit and preparatory military training. ' Above
all, however, the princely function or institution of the
Roman Republic proved superior to the personal leadership of
princes. Ability is not assured in hereditary princes, and
an incompetent prince cannot be easily removed from his 
q 5throne.“ In a republic patterned after the Roman example, 
many more men have a chance to prove their capabilities on 
and off the battlefield. As a result, over time, many able 
generals emerge. And since citizen generals are chosen for 
limited terms, subject to removal or replacement, republics 
can adapt to new situations by changing the leader of their 
armies. For a prince finds it hard to change his nature and 
normal methods of proceeding when circumstances dictate a 
different approach. A republic can change its military
^^The Prince, 12, p. 48.
^^Ibid., 14, pp. 55-57; The Art of W a r , I, p. 580. 
^^Discourses, I, 9, p. 219; II, 6, p. 343.
^^Ibid., I, 2, pp. 197-198; 10, p. 222 ; 11, p. 226 ;
20, p. 246.
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leaders to suit the situation at hand and can, therefore, 
adapt more readily to the t i m e s . T h i s  opens up the possi 
bility of having many able leaders in succession and mini­
mizes the risk of poor leadership in critical situations.^^ 
Republics must also be prepared to cope with dire emer­
gencies that threaten the very stability or existence of the 
state. Hence, Machiavelli suggests that, at times, it is 
necessary to concentrate prince-like power in the hands of
one man to take quick and decisive action to remedy a dan-
9 8gerous situation. He praised the Roman practice of set­
ting up a Dictator to cope with such emergencies, and he 
saw the Roman Dictatorship as a basic and important part of 
the Roman constitution. As long as the Romans remained un­
co r rup ted, he believed that this institution did more good 
than harm to the city. Roman citizens never thought of 
abusing the power of the Dictatorship, since they received
greater honor and reputation for overcoming a crisis quickly
9 9than in remaining as Dictator. So long as the Dictator 
was selected and charged with his duties under the laws, the 
risk of enslavement was minimal. Power seized rather than
^^The Prince , 12, p. 48; 17, pp. 63-64; Discourses, I , 
20, p. 246; 30, p. 261; III, 9, pp. 452-453.
^^Discourses, I, 20, p. 246.
^^Ibid., 33, 34, 35, pp. 264-270.
^^Ibid., 30, p . 261.
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power granted by public laws is to be feared. Besides, 
Machiavelli did not see the Roman Dictatorship as an abso­
lute power. One man was given the power to "decide for him­
self about the remedies for that urgent peril and to do 
everything without consultation and to punish anybody with­
out appeal," but his power was supposedly limited to dealing 
with a specific situation or problem and was to last only for 
the duration of the emergency. He was not "empowered to do
things that might weaken the state, such as taking authority 
away from the Senate and the people, or doing away with the 
old institutions of the city and making new ones y ^^1 Thus, 
Roirian Dictators were subject to review by the Senate and the 
people. Presumably, any attempt to abuse this authority
would have met with strong resistance and a lack of partisan
10 2support, so long as Rome remained incorrupt. In any case,
for the sake of coping with such crises and to ensure adapta­
tion to new situations, the Roman practice of appointing a 
Dictator proved beneficial to the republic. And it was a 
useful practice not only in dealing with external crises but 
also as one means of restoring good civic order. When the 
method of accusations is no longer sufficient to restrain 
citizens from seeking reputations in private ways, a repub-
^^^Ibid., 34, p. 268.
lOllbid.
^°^Ibid., III, 8, pp. 449-451.
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lie can resort to stronger medicine, as Rome did when she 
appointed Dictators. Through this '"kingly arm" Rome "made 
those return within bounds who had gone outside them. . . .
In summary, Machiavelli valued the Roman nobles primar­
ily for their leadership abilities. The Roman Senate was 
the institutional preserve of the nobles. For Machiavelli,
it was the vital center of leadership in Rome. Yet, by in­
stitutionalizing the power of the people, Rome brought out 
the best qualities of the nobles, who frequently conducted 
themselves in honorable and admirable ways. Each class of 
men had a rank in the government, commensurate with their
self-image. The people had great respect for individual
10 5nobles and even sought to emulate them. Hence, some of
the people became as able as the nobles, and this added even 
more to the number of excellent men in that republic. By 
moving in the direction of growth and expansion, Rome stirred 
the people to greater demands for power, which eventually 
brought that city to ruin. But the demise of that republic 
would have come sooner if the people had been excluded. By 
harnessing the power of the people, Rome was able to build 
an empire. In her mixed government, ambition was channeled 
in ways that strengthened the city as a whole, while avoiding
^^^Ibid., 28, p. 493.
^°^See, e.g., ibid.. I, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8; II, 32, 33,
37, 53.
lOSThe History of Florence, III, 1, pp. 1140-1141
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for a long time, extremes of economic or civic inequalities 
and personal claims to absolute power. With proper institu­
tions and political mechanisms, a republic can benefit greatly 
even by the actions of the most selfish and ambitious men, 
for they will be forced to seek reputations and glory in 
ways that strengthen the republic.
^'^^Ibid., VII, 1, pp. 1336-1337
CHAPTER IV 
CORRUPTION AND REFORM
Machiavelli believed that civic corruption is inevit­
able. No polity, however well-ordered, will last forever, 
as the experience of the Roman Republic indicates. Machia­
velli 's pessimistic view of man and his reading of history 
would not allow him to believe otherwise. He thought that 
men are naturally egocentric and inclined towards idleness, 
laziness, and se 1f -giatification. And he held out no hope 
of radically changing human nature, declaring that men are 
essentially the same in all ages. Hence, he saw conflict 
as a normal part of the human experience. At best, all that 
men can hope for is to establish a civic order that tempo­
rarily channels human behavior and conflict in ways that 
benefit a city and pi event corruption for a long time.
Although Mac}iiavelli thought that men remain essentially 
the same in all ages, he did believe that m a n ’s behavior can 
be significantly influenced by rational political organiza­
tion. The more egotistical and destructive tendencies of 
human nature can be controlled, and human behavior can be 
effectively molded by means of mian-made laws, customs, and 
institutions. Rational order can be imposed on man's irra-
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tional nature. Corruption can be temporarily prevented or 
arrested by carefully organizing a city in such a way that 
the ambitions of men are channeled in directions that sta­
bilize and strengthen the civic order. When this is done, 
a city may temporarily rise to greater heights of power and 
e x c e H e n c e  . ̂
The basic organization of the civic order is crucial 
in preventing corruption and redirecting man's behavior in 
ways that benefit a city. The Roman Republic was the supreme 
historical example of a well-ordered polity for Machiavelli. 
By institutionalizing the authority of the nobles in the 
Senate, the power of the people in the Tribunate and prince­
like power in the Consulate, the Roman Republic ensured that 
men were given a rank in the formal civic order commensurate 
with their ambitions and abilities, while also providing for 
effective but controllable leadership of her armies in the 
field and in emergency situations that threatened the sta­
bility or existence of the state. A mixed form of republic, 
which provides a share in government for all classes of men 
whi1e retaining a princely function for military and emer­
gency purposes, will stand the best change of preventing 
civic corruption for a long time, and it will do so through 
ordered conflict that drives men forward in a concerted 
effort to strengthen the state. A civic order of the Roman
^See, e.g.. Discourses, II, 2, p. 322; 19, p. 381.
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kind retains a preeminent leadership role for the leading men 
of a city, but the arrogance and domineering spirit of the 
nobles is held in check by the numerical power and military 
value of the people, who continually raise objections to real 
or imagined oppression and demand more authority and a greater 
share of wealth through their institutionalized leaders. Under 
such conditions, the nobles are continually challenged to pro­
vide effective leadership, which mollifies and satisfies the 
people, while still retaining their special position in the 
civic order. Without such challenge, the arrogant behavior of 
the nobles would soon destabilize and weaken the republic. At 
the same time, the people have an institutionalized method of 
venting their concerns, fears, and desires, which must be taken 
into account by the nobles in developing and carrying out state 
affairs. The clash between the nobles and the people is never 
ending. The basic desires of both classes remain the same.
But the behavior of both classes is conditioned and channeled 
by an ordered conflict that takes place within a framework of 
basic institutions.
In addition to the basic organization of the state, other 
forms of social organization and control can play a significant 
role in modifying the behavior of individuals and groups of peo­
ple. The importance of a citizen army in civic education has al­
ready been mentioned. A well-regulated citizen militia not only 
provides the best means of military defense and expansion, but 
it also serves to train and discipline citizens for the rigors 
and hardships of war and for good citizenship. Good military
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training will teach men to respect ci\ic authority and to obey 
the laws of a city. The experience of a well-ordered and 
highly disciplined life as a citizen-soldier is not left on 
the battlefield. Good citizen-soldiers will bring a commit­
ment to order and discipline into their civilian lives, al­
though civilian life can never be as highly disciplined and 
tightly organized as the military. Thus, military training 
is an effective means of inculcating a sense of civic loyalty 
or patriotism i n the ci ti zenry of a republic.
Religious institutions and practices provide another 
means of conditioning the behavior of citizens. Religion 
facilitated the designs of the Roman Senate and Consuls in
making laws, managing wars and armies, gaining support from
2the people, and so on. If military discipline reinforces 
religious beliefs and practices, it is even more true that 
effective military organization and training cannot be intro­
duced and maintained, except v/ith difficulty, among irre- 
ligious men. Fear of God or of the gods makes men obedient 
and law-abiding; where such fear is lacking, men are much 
less willing to submit to military discipline or any other 
form of regulation.^ When divine authority is used as the 
basis for introducing or sustaining laws or customs, religious 
men are more likely to willingly submit to discipline and even
2lbid., I, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, pp. 223-234 
3jbid., 11, pp. 224-225.
4lbid., p. 225.
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sacrifice on behalf of their city. Therefore, rulers should 
always observe, or at least appear to observe, the ceremonies 
of their religion.  ̂ Leaders can then effectively use reli­
gious beliefs and practices to influence the behavior of 
citizens and soldiers. In general, good laws and good mili­
tary organization cannot exist or be maintained without reli­
gion .
Machiavelli preferred a religion like that of the ancient 
Romans, a civic religion that emphasizes the central impor­
tance of the city. He preferred the ancient pagan religion 
for the way in which in invigorated men through the use of 
ferocious ceremonies, oaths, and otlier devices. He favored 
paganism because it taught men to value worldly honor and 
accomplishments and a vigorous, active life in service to 
their city. Berlin’s suggestion that Machiavelli has dis­
turbed posterity by raising, consciously or unconsciously, 
the possibility of a moral alternative to Christianity seems 
highly plausible.^ However, it is not clear whether Machia­
velli actually conceived of two separate moralities. Appar­
ently, Machiavelli did not reject Christianity outright, but
blamed men for interpreting Christianity ’’according to sloth
7and not according to vigor.” He objected to the Christian
^Ibid., 12, p. 226.
^Berlin, 29-50.
nDiscourses, II, 2, p. 331.
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religion of his own time, because it caught men to value the 
salvation of their individual souls more than the safety and
gglory of their own cities. It taught men to be meek and 
contemplative, passive and inactive in civic affairs. And 
he thought that, if good men eschew involvement in political 
and military affairs, there will always be wicked men who 
will take advantage of the situation to satisfy their per­
sonal desires. He wanted men to be bold, proud, and inde­
pendent, ready to defend their own honor and that of their 
city. The ancient pagans were independent and proud, will 
ing CO fight for ^chat they valued in this world; yet they 
i.erc also obedient, comr'it ted. to theii cities and willing 
to submit to rigorous military training.
La.'S :.re also one of the principal means of civic educa­
tion and social control.  ̂ To be effective, laws must not be 
for the benefit of only one class or group of men. They 
should be applied uniformly and impartially, without regard 
for ind cvidua 1 rank or status and without regard to past 
dee^ls '.'r future promises. Above all, they should clearly 
proscribe forms of behavior that destabilize and corrupt 
the city, p? oviding foi’ severe punishment of infractions. At 
the same time, they should prescribe legal methods of gain­
ing reputation and authority that benefit the city, and nien
^Ibid., pp. 330-331.
9c:See pp. 79-00, above, for a related discussion
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should be encouraged to seek reputations in these ways and 
should be rewarded for deeds that strengthen the city.
A city should also have a publicly sanctioned method 
for its citizens to bring charges against fellow-citizens.
As noted in chapter 3, when people have a legal means of 
venting their distrust or hatred of others, they are less 
likely to resort to illegal or private methods to obtain 
satisfaction.^^ And slandering should not be allowed, thus 
eliminating a major cause of conflict.
Given m a n ’s self- seeking nature and general aversion, to 
hard w o r k , Machiavelli concludes tliat men generally will not 
conduct themselves in ways that benefit a city unless some 
necessity compels them to do so, as for example, a barren 
country that forces men to work hard and to cooperate in 
order to s u r v i v e . H o w e v e r ,  he rejected the kind of neces­
sities a barren country imposes on people, because wars are 
inevitable, leaving no reasonable alternative but to build a
city on fertile land so it has the capacity to grow strong
12to defend and expand its dominion. But he suggests an
even more effective substitute to force men to be industrious,
13vigorous, and cooperative: man-made laws. When properly
^^See pp. 80-82, for a related discussion. 
 ̂̂'Discourses, I, 1, pp. 19 3- 194.
^^Ibid.
^^Ibid., p. 194.
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conceived and administered, such laws can compel men to 
exercise or to do whatever is necessary to maintain physical 
strength and endurance. Better yet, such laws can provide 
for a civic order that imposes greater necessities on men 
than any natural barrenness of country, while still ensuring 
that wealth is accumulated and used in ways that strengthen 
rather than weaken the state. This, Machiavelli believed, 
had happened to Rome: her early laws forced so many neces­
sities on people ‘'that the fertility of the site, the con­
venience of the sea, her frequent victories, and the great­
ness of her empire could not for many centuries corrupt 
h er. . . .
When a city is poorly organized, lacking the kind of 
civic order described above, man's behavior will more nearly 
approximate his fundamentally avaricious nature, as the 
example of Florence i n d i c a t e s , W h e n  there are no lawful 
ways for people to express their concerns and to vent their 
hatreds, men turn to illegal methods. Class conflict is 
dysfunctional because it is unrestrained and undirected. In­
stability is the order of the day, for neither class is willing 
to share power and authority and each class seeks to dominate
I bi i d . , p . 19 5.
See, e.g., ibid., 49, p. 296; The H istory of Florence, 
III, 5, pp. 1145-1148; IV, 1, p. 1187; ^ Discourse on Reraodel 
ing the Government of Florence, pp. 101, 106.
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the other. Partisan divisions arise, as people resort to 
private forces to gain their ends. Powerful individuals 
attain personal followings and public authority is weakened. 
Citizens attempt to gain reputations and partisans by the 
"conferring of benefits on various private persons by lend­
ing them money, marrying off their daughters, protecting 
them from the magistrates, and doing them similar favors.
Such actions "make men partisans of their benefactors and
give the man they follow courage to think he can corrupt
17the public and violate the laws." In a well-organized 
city that is still incorrupt, such actions would fail be­
cause citizens would not support men who try to gain favor
1 sin such ways. Machiavelli cites the example of Camillus, 
who was driven from Rome for just such attempts to gain power 
through personal forces and private benefits.^""
But even rational political organization is insufficient 
by itself to delay the onset of civic corruption. It must 
be coupled with a policy of military expansionism to ensure 
that people continue to obey the laws, observe religious 
ceremonies, and maintain rigorous military training. The 
laws, religion, and military training can provide some
^^Discourses, III, 28, p. 493.
l^Ibid.; see also. The History of Floren ce, VII, 1, 
pp. 1336-1337.
1^Discourses. III, 8, pp. 449-450.
19lbid., 23, pp. 484-485.
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measure of civic education and social controJ, but only the 
fear of external enemies will bring people together in a 
collective effort to overcome all adversaries. An external 
threat or challenge from a real or potential enemy is the 
additional element needed to prevent corruption and to pre­
serve the civic order for a long time. A major cause of
civic corruption is peace itself, which tends to divide a
2 0city and to make people "effeminate.*' In peaceful times, 
men tend to revert back toward their basic nature, becoming 
self-seeking and lazy, more concerned with a soft, luxurious 
life and sensual gratification than in maintaining the found­
ing principles of their city.
Paradoxically, by organizing for expansion and growth,
a city will just as inevitably be exposed to foreign customs
21and other influences that tend to corrupt people. As a 
city grows in population, wealth, and power, the very seeds 
of corruption are sown, for inevitably, all cities reach a 
false sense of security when they have conquered all ad­
versaries cr have become so rich and powerful that they fear 
no one. As this occurs over time, people become so confident 
of their security that they turn from a vigorous, frugal life 
to one of ease, luxury, and idleness. Even Rome finally 
reached a point when she "no longer feared lier wars," and as
^°Ibid., I, 6, p. 210.
21lbid., I, 6, pp. 208-209; 55, p. 308; II, 19, p. 581; 
III, 27, p. 491.
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a result, she started giving positions of authority to men 
who gained favor by illegal and immoral means, men more
interested in their own reputations and personal power than
2 ?in the good of the city. A rational political organization 
and a policy of expansionism can ensure greater stability and 
a longer life for a republic, but corruption cannot be con­
tained forever.
Neglect of able men in republics is one immediate cause
of factional strife. In times of peace, exceptional men are
2 3needed less and so they are neglected. When wars cease or 
are no longer feared, the envy of lesser men manifests itself,
and men of little ability seek to be the equals or superiors
of those excellent men, who were previously relied upon for 
leadership. This injures able men who may "fail to attain 
their proper rank" and are "obliged to have as associates 
and superiors men who are unworthy and of less ability than 
themselves. Disorders result from such injuries, because 
men of proven abilities already have supporters who will 
help them regain their former standing in the republic. Hence 
they may stir up new and dangerous wars so that their ser­
vices will be needed, or they may seek revenge in private 
ways that are injurious to the city, so long as public recog­
nition and honors commensurate with their abilities and past
22ibid., III, 16, p. 469; see also, II, 22, pp. 385-386. 
23ibid., Ill, 16, pp. 468-470- 
24ibid., p. 469.
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accomplishments are denied them.
Machiavel1i snggests two temporary remedies to prevent
neglect of able men. First, a republic can try to keep its
citizens relatively poor, so envious men of little ability
cannot easily corrupt "themselves or others with riches" to
2 5win partisans. Second, a republic can "continually make
war" so that it will always "need citizens of high repute,
like the Romans in their early days." So long as Rome was
expandiiig its doniinion and was invoiced in dangerous wars
2 7"she always needed able men." As noted above, expansionism 
is necessary to contain corruption for a long time.
But IVha I does Mcichiavelli mean by suggesting that repub­
lics keep the I ? itizens poor? He thought that economic 
activities and growth are essential for ensuring political 
power and endurance. He believed that m a n ’s desire for 
worldly possessions and honors is insatiable and ingrained 
in his nature; he never entertained the possibility of
o  peradicating it. But these basic desires must be controlled 
by political rules that prevent the improper use of wealth 
to subvert tlie civic oi'de? . He encouraged princes to promote 
commerce and industry in their c i t i e s . A n d ,  as noted in
25ibid.
2bIbid. ; compare. The A rt of W a r , I, p. 5 77.
27Discourse s , III, 16, p. 469.
28see pp. 51 52 above.
29See, e.g.. The Prince, 21, p. 84; 19, p. 70.
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chapter 3, he thought that republics are superior to prince­
doms largely because of a greater sense of confidence on the 
part of people that they can engage in a variety of economic
activities, accumulate personal wealth, and remain secure in
3 0their possessions. Yet, too much wealth tends to corrupt
31the civic order. And in an uncorrupted city, so long as
the laws are observed, great individual wealth cannot exist.
Machiavelli is not at all precise about this, but his 
general point is clear. In wel1-ordered, uncorrupted repub­
lics, men will think more of the public good, or the good of 
the city, than of their own individual good. Perhaps more 
accurately, they will identify their own good with that of 
their city. Machiavelli wrote that "well-ordered republics 
ought to keep their treasuries rich and their citizens poor.
. . Surely he did not mean by this that cities should
stifle economic activity or personal accumulation of riches. 
But he did mean that proper customs, laws, and institutions 
should channe] economic activities so that they strengthen 
a city, preventing the misuse of personal wealth to influence 
political affairs or to subvert the political process for 
selfish purposes. He cites Rome as a city that kept its
32
^^See pp. 7 5-79 above. 
^^Discourses , III, 25, p. 488. 
^^Ibid., I, 34, pp. 267-268. 
^^Ibid., 37, p . 272.
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treasury rich and its citizens poor, while still uncorrupted.
He even suggests that "four hundred years after Rome had been
built, her people were still in the utmost poverty." Of
course, in the early Roman Republic, individuals were allowed
to accumulate personal wealth, but the crucial point is that
the early Romans placed ability above any social or economic
factor in determining the worth of an individual:
I cannot believe that any condition was 
stronger in producing this effect than the 
knowledge that poverty did not close your 
road to whatever rank and whatever honor, 
and that men went to seek Ability [sic] 
whatever house she lived in. Such a state 
of society evidently gave less desirability 
to riches.36
The organization and laws of the Roman Republic assured that 
men were lionored more for deeds that benefited the city as a 
whole than those that served to increase individual wealth.
So the accumulation and use of wealth must be regulated to 
prevent corruption, but economic activities that strengthen 
a city must be encouraged.
In war, the early Romans did not allow individuals to 
become rich because they weie victorious or brave. Whatever 
riches came with victory became public spoils, not private 
booty. Wealth gained from wars was distributed relatively
^^Ibid., II, 19, p. 378. 
^^Ibid., III, 25, p. 486. 
^^Ibid.
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evenly, frequently in accordance with established ranks, or 
it was used to finance future public enterprises, thereby
*7 nlessening the likelihood of additional taxes. In contrast,
through the words of Fabrizio, Machiavelli complains that
"present wars make poorer both those rulers who win and those
who lose, for if one loses his state, the other loses his
38money and his goods. . . ." This was because his contem-
porariss utilized mercenary and auxiliary armies, frequently
leaving the booty of victory to the soldiers or their leaders,
not to mention the price paid for their services in the first 
39place. These Italian wars often added to the tax burden
of the victor and vanquished alike, and individuals rather 
than cities became richer as a result.
The Italian military practices of Machiavelli’s time
tended to corrupt the civic order in a more fundamental sense.
The general reliance on mercenary and auxiliary forces had
the same effect as an extended peace:
So the vigor that in other countries is 
usually destroyed by long peace was in 
Italy destroyed by the cowardice of those 
wars, as is made clear by what we shall re­
late from 1434 to 1494. The reader will 
see there that at last a new road was 
opened to the barbarians, and Italy put 
herself back into slavery to t h e m . 40
37ibid., I, 37, p. 272; II, 19, p. 378; III, 25, pp.
48 7-488; The Art of W a r , V, p. 6 72.
S^The Art of W a r , V, p. 671.
39Ibid., pp. 671-672 ; see also. The History of Florence, 
VI, 1, pp- 1284-1285.
40The His cory of Florence, V, 1, p. 12 33.
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These earl ier r 115, prior to the invasion of Italy by the 
French King, Charles VIII, were neither dangerous nor harsh, 
in Machiavelli's estimation, as compared to wars fought in 
ancient times. In his terms, Italy had neither peace nor 
war : "for peace it cannot be called in which princedoms are 
continually attacking one another with armies," but wars 
"they cannot be called in which men are not killed, cities 
are not sacked, princedoms are not destroyed, because those 
wars became so feeble that they were begun without fear, 
carried on without danger, and ended without damage. 
Machiavelli suggests that these Italian wars had become es­
sentially bloodless on the battlefield and of little or no 
danger to participating states.^ " Therefore, people had less 
to fear from war than in ancient times, and this was no bless 
ing in Machiavelli's eyes. Ancient cities valued their free­
dom and nurtured military discipline for fear of what might 
happen if they lost a war:
Then men overcame in war either were killed 
or kept in perpetual slavery, so that they 
passed their lives wretchedly ; conquered cit­
ies were either laid waste or the inhabitants 
driven out, their goods taken from them and 
they themselves sent wandering through the 
world. Hence those conquered in war suffered 
the utmost of every misery. Terrorized by 
this dread, men kept military training alive
I bid. , see also, ibid.. I, 39, p. 10 7 9.
^^Ibid., V, 33, pp. 1279-1280; VII, 20, pp. 1362-1363; 
cf. The Prince, 12, p. 51.
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and lionored those who were excellent in
Mr contrasted this barbarous picture of ancient warfare with
the less menacing military practices of his day:
Today this fear has for the most part dis­
appeared ; of the conquered, few are killed; 
no one is long held a prisoner because cap­
tives are easily freed. Cities, even though 
they have rebelled many times, are not de­
stroyed; men are allowed to keep their prop­
erty , so that the greatest evil they fear is 
a tax. Hence men do not wish to submit to
military regulations and to endure steady
hardships under them in order to escape dan­gers they fear l i t t l e . ^4
As a result, when foreigners invaded Italy in 1494, the Ital­
ians were unprepared to withstand the onslaught, because they 
had oecome soft and had forgotten how frightful war could be. 
Even though wars then became more bloody and dangerous, the 
Italians lacked the kind of military organization and dis­
cipline to cope with the new invaders.
As corruption spread in the Roman P.epublic, the class 
conflict that once proved beneficial turned into factional 
strife that led to the eventual ruin of that republic.
Neither class was ever fully satisfied with its share of
power and wealth. Temporary reconciliation was always short
lived. As the Roman populace won more concessions from the 
nobles, it immediately began fighting for more power, more
"̂"The Art of W a r , II, p . 6 2 
'^^Ibid.
^^Ibid., VII, p. 724.
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public ofiices, and more w e a l t h . T h i s  conflict was es­
pecially bitter over the so-called Agrarian Laws, which 
provided the immediate impetus to a complete breakdown of 
ordered c o n f l i c t . S i n c e  this law called for limiting the 
amount of land that citizens could own and dividing up land 
taken from other peoples among all Roman people, it was es­
pecially injurious to the nobles. If it had been implemented, 
this law would have taken away property from the nobles, who 
possessed more than the law would allow, and it would also 
have deprived the nobles of one means of acquiring greater 
wealth. As Rome expanded its dominion, this law had been 
temporarily set aside, because lands obtained in warfare were 
too far away to interest most people and because of the prac­
tice of sending colonies to reside in these areas. But in 
time, the Agrarian Law was brought up again by the Gracchi.
By then, Rome was so powerful and wealthy that she no longer 
feared external foes, and the people had already become 
soft and self-seeking. Hence, in the final struggles over 
the Agrarian Laws, there was much bloodshed, factions devel­
oped, and magistrates lost effective control over the situa­
tion. Civil warfare ensued, parties were formed, and event­
ually a victorious Caesar enslaved Rome.
Another contributing factor to the dissolution of the
Piscourse s , I, 5, p. 205; 37, p. 272.
'^^Ibid., 37, pp. 272- 275; III, 24, pp. 485-486.
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Roman Republic was the perverse practice of prolonging supreme 
c o m m a n d s . M a c h i a v e l l i  believed that it is always dangerous 
to grant authority for a. long time in any public office, but 
especially in the highest political and military offices of 
a city, This perverse practice was damaging for two primary 
reasons. First, fewer men were given a chance to command, 
so fewer developed the skills and abilities of commanding. 
Moreover, only a few gained fame and reputation for military 
exploits. Second, as Roman conquests spread farther afield 
and fewer men experienced supreme command, the army became 
less controllable. Commanders remained in office so long 
that the soldiers often developed greater loyalty to their
general than to their city, forgetting the authority of the
^ 49Senate.
In order to last a long time, a republic must be brought 
back or returned frequently to its beginnings, or to the first 
principles that originally shaped the character of its people 
The basic organization of government, various customs and laws, 
religious and military institutions, and other social organi­
zations and mechanisms comprise the founding experiences and 
traditions of a people. But as time goes by, the heirs of 
this heritage begin to reap the benefits of greater wealth
"^^Ibid. , III, 24, pp. 485- 486.
Ibid., p. 486; The Prince, 19, pp. 67-76. 
^°Ibid., III, 1. pp. 419-423.
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and power, made possible because of good civic order. As 
they are successful in attaining great wealth and power, 
they begin to lose touch with their origins, forgetting why 
their foundations are so important to political stability 
and endurance. Men begin to act in ways that subvert the 
real value of the original laws, customs, and institutions. 
Machiavelli suggests that men can be brought back toward the 
first principles of their city either by "external accident" 
or "internal p r u d e n c e . B y  "external accident," Machiavelli 
means such dire necessities as the threat of defeat in war, 
an actual defeat on the battlefield, or a similar kind of 
event that engenders fear or great concern in the minds of 
men, so that they return to their original goodness, by o b ­
serving the laws, religious ceremonies, military practices, 
and the like, and obeying civil authorities. By "internal 
prudence," he means that either a new law is promulgated or 
an excellent man sets an example that has the same effect as 
a new law. Either way, men must be brought back to their 
original lespect for the laws and fear of the penalties for 
breaking them. And he even suggests that if this had hap­
pened at least every ten years in Rome, that republic "would
c 2never have become corrupt." Unfortunately, reinforcement 
of the laws to return men to first principles becomes rarer
 ̂ I b i d . , p . 419.
^^Ibid., p. 421.
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as corruption spreads.
Besides, such laws cannot contain corruption forever 
and eventually more fundamental changes will be needed. The 
reason for this is that the original customs and institutions 
of a city "never, or seldom, vary,” but as the conduct of 
citizens becomes perverse, these customs and institute ons
eventually no longer serve to control and channel human be-
S 3havior in beneficial \/ays. Machiavelli explained what he
meant in this regard by the example of Rome. He distinguished.
between the "basic organization" of the Roman government and
the "laws which, along with the magistrates, restrained the 
5 4citizens." He defined the basic organization as the 
"authority of the people, of the Senate, of the Tribunes, 
of the Consuls, the manner of choosing and setting up magis­
trates, and the manner of making the laws."^"^ He then noted 
that this basic organization remained essentially the same as 
the Romans became more corrupt. New laws were made to re­
strain citizens. However, without changing the basic orga­
nization, in time, these laws were simply "not enough to 
keep men good. As an example, he suggests that originally 
the Romans gave the Consulate and other high offices only to
^^Ibid., I , 18, p. 241. 
^"^£bid.
^"Ibid.
^^Ibid-
109
those who '’asked for them. And for a time, this was a
good custom, because only worthy citizens would ask for such 
offices, since only worthy men were esteemed and honored.
After the city became corrupt, however, this custom was 
harmful, because then only powerful, self-serving men started 
asking for such offices and able men were ignored. As 
another example, he mentions that originally any Roman citi 
zen had a right to "propose a law to the people" and anyone 
else had the right to "speak, either for or against" a pro­
posal "before it was d e c i d e d . T h i s  was also a good custom, 
so long as people proposed things for the good of the city, 
but later on, as corruption set in, "only the powerful pro­
posed laws" for their own benefit, and othei men remained 
silent either because they feared these powerful men or were 
their partisans.
The reason that such customs seldom change in time to 
halt corruption is that where many are involved in government, 
as in a republic, it is very difficult to make basic changes 
because no agreement can be reached with so many diverse 
opinions. Machiavelli concludes that "new basic methods" 
must be formed as the matter becomes corrupted, but "since
^^Ibid.
^^Ibid., pp. 241-242.
^^Ibid., p. 242.
^^See, e.g.. Discourses, I, 9, p. 218; III, 9, p. 453.
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these basic methods must be replaced either all at once, when 
they evidently are no longer good, or little by little, b e ­
fore they generally are recognized as bad, I say that both 
of these two things are almost impossible. It is highly 
unlikely that a man of such foresight will arise in time to 
suggest such changes, and even if he did, he could not per­
suade enough citizens to accept his views. This leaves only 
one alternative: someone must seize absolute power to make 
basic changes. But even this is an unlikely solution be­
cause it is rare that a man will possess both the will to 
use unlawful means and the desire to reestablish lawful gov­
ernment once again in a city. A corrupt man may seize
absolute power for his own glory, but rarely will a man be 
found who will do so for the gJory of his city.
Uitimately, then, only radical reform will save a repub­
lic from total corruption. A new hero-prince must seize 
absolute power to make fundamental changes. Although Machia­
velli thought such hero-princes are rarely found, his liopes 
for redeeming ItaJy from foreign invaders and for reforming 
his beloved Florence rested on just such a slim chance.
^^Ibid., I, 18, p. 242.
^^Ibid., p. 243.
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this study was to reconsider the true 
nature of Machiavelli’s republicanism in an attempt to re­
solve the apparent contradiction between Mach.i avelii ' s re­
publican and princely teachings. The purpose was to clarify 
Machiavel 1 i ’ s political theory. Too often, students of ?v]ach- 
iavelli have been bent on either vindicating or condemning 
him; as a result, their arguments often twist the truth and 
cloud the meaning of his theory. Or some commentators, find 
ing it difficult to believe that anyone could sincerely ad­
vocate both princely and republican forms of government, 
argue that Machiavelli must have been committed to only one 
form of government or the other. But such attitudes and 
approaches to the study of Machiavelli are necessarily mis­
leading .
hhat conclusions, then, can be drawn from this study? 
Above all, there i s no real contradiction between the re­
publican and princely aspects of Machiavelli's thought. He 
sincerely advocated princely rule under certain conditions, 
namely, tc found or refourni a government and in situations 
of great inequality, corruption, and servitude. But he
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advocated l epublican governmej^t, as the end result of the 
founder's or reformer's w o r k , in all other situations, i.e., 
where equality and civic, virtue prevail and people are used 
to managing their own affairs. It all depends, or should 
depend, on the condition of a people as to whether princely 
or republican rule is most appropriate and feasible, with 
one exception: short term princely rule is always desirable 
to found or reform a government.
Machiavelli was not coma,itted unconditionally to any 
one form of government, for he valued political stability 
and endurance above all else. But this does not mean that 
he nad no preferences. On the contrary, he believed that 
republics are superior to princedoms, in part because "they 
are inherently more stable and durable. Such regimes are 
more durable in large measure because of their capacity to 
grow and expand, ana Machiavellr valued expansion for a num­
ber of reasons. For one thing, he believed that wars are 
all but inevitable, so states must be prepared not only for 
defense but for expansion as well. Republics normally wel­
come population increases, encourage greater economic 
activity, and provide more individual opportunities for men 
to realize their ambitions, whereas princes normally dis­
courage such things. Machiavelli also valued an independent 
people, rathei" than a subservient one. He equated servility 
with great inequality and corruption. At best, he wanted 
citizens to be committed to the good of their city; at a
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minimum, he wanted their behavior channeled in ways that 
strengthen their city. He preferred an active citizenry.
He disliked a servile people, unable or unwilling to take 
an active role in civic affairs. He also believed that re­
publics can adapt with the times far better than princedoms, 
because republics depend upon many able men, whereas prince­
doms depend upon one man, who may fail in a critical situa­
tion.
Machiavelli b'^^Iicved strongly in the possibilities of 
imitating the past, for he believed that men remain basically 
the same over time. He advocated the Roman kind of mixed 
government, because it inccrporated three essential elements: 
princely power, ins titu tionalized in the form of Consuls; 
arastocratic power, instltuLionalized in the Roman Senate; 
and popular power, jnstitutionalized in the Tribunate. Such 
a regime is most srable and long 1 as ting because it prevents 
any class or any one individual from dominating the govern­
ment, at least for a long period of time, while channeling 
the energies and ambitions of men in publicly useful direc­
tions .
Ma chiave 111 did not believe tha t conflict can be elimi 
nated from human affairs, either externally between states 
or internally within political communities. For him, the 
mal or interna], conflict in all cities is tl'at between the 
few, rich and powerful men and the vast majority of common
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people. With proper organization and laws, he believed that 
this conflict can benefit a city, as it did in Rome. Such 
conflict is bound to occur. The important thing is to pro­
vide for publicly beneficial ways in which the people can 
express their frustrations and concerns, while also ensuring 
that the nobles retain their special rank and leadership role 
in the republic. Without harnessing the great power of the 
people, Rome could not have grown so powerful, for the peo­
ple represent the resources needed to conquer and hold new 
lands. rioroGveiy liberty could no^ have been maintained for 
so long, because the arrogance and ambitions of the nobles 
would have divided the city into bitter factions much sooner, 
if the people liad not checked their excessive desires to 
dominate and oppress.
Corruption cannot be prevented forever. Even the best 
organized regime will eventually decline, for the very seeds 
of corruptic.n are sown when such a state embarks on a pol icy 
of growth, and expansion. Machiavelli believed that such a 
policy is the only reasonable alternative in s hostile world. 
Yet ultimately success can only bring peace, and peace, de ­
cay. Eventually, only radical reform can save a republic 
from total corruption, and that requires the power of an 
absolute prince.
That is the pessimistic side of Machiavelli. But he 
had an optimistic side, as well. He strongly believed that 
decline and decay can be halted by an absolute ruler in all
H E
but the worst of situations. Ej cept where there is exten­
sive corruption, there is always a possibility that a new re­
public can be fouTided. In addition, traditions of liberty 
and republican government die hard. Leaders and institutions 
may fail oi become corrupted, but so long as the general mass 
of men remain committed to republican ideals, reform is pos­
sible.
Machiavelli's republic is not "democratic" in the modern 
sense of that term. Yet we cannot say that it is aristocratic 
eithei. It is a truly mixed regime. The nobles provide the 
leadership and direction, but they cannot do so in an unre­
stricted v:ay. For the people represent a very real power that 
cannot be ignored or consistently abused. Yet Machiavelli 
could also admire the Roman nobles for deftly utilizing reli­
gious catJiS and ether means to ensure support of the people 
for policies they wanted to implement. Without such leader­
ship « the continual confrontation between tlie classes An Rome 
could have become too one-sided or dysfunctional. To Machia­
velli, both the leadership of tJie nobility and the countervail 
ijig force of the people were absolutely necessary to channel 
the energies and ambitions of men in ways that strengthened 
Rome. We may disagree with his point of view or his moral pos 
ture on certain matters, but we should not let our feelings 
cloud our vision. Machiavel li. * s republicanism may be similar, 
in many respects, to earlier and later concepts, but it is 
also unique, and should be recognized as such.
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